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This study reviews the impact of Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit 
on working mothers.
April 2003 saw the introduction of two new tax credits, Child Tax Credit and 
Working Tax Credit. Although working in different ways, these were both 
intended to support families with children, reduce child poverty, and make 
work pay for those on low incomes. They are a central plank of the Labour 
Government’s ambitious policy of reducing and eventually abolishing child 
poverty.
This report:
n investigates the impact of the tax credits on the participation of women with 
children in the labour market
n explores why those eligible to receive these credits do not always take them 
up
n assesses whether the credits act as an incentive for mothers to reduce their 
working hours, and
n reviews the policy implications of the fi ndings.
The study used data from the three latest available rounds of interviews of 
the longitudinal Families and Children Study (FACS), 2002/03–2004/05. The 
methodology also has lessons for those interested in pinpointing the most 
appropriate way of modelling the impact of the new tax credits.
This publication can be provided in other formats, such as 
large print, Braille and audio.  Please contact:
Communications, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 
The Homestead, 40 Water End, York YO30 6WP.  
Tel: 01904 615905.  Email: info@jrf.org.uk
The impact of tax credits on mothers’ 
employment
Yekaterina Chzhen and Sue Middleton
The Joseph Rowntree Foundation has supported this project as part of its programme 
of research and innovative development projects, which it hopes will be of value to 
policymakers, practitioners and service users. The facts presented and views expressed in 
this report are, however, those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Foundation.
Joseph Rowntree Foundation, The Homestead, 40 Water End, York YO30 6WP
Website: www.jrf.org.uk
About the authors
Yekaterina Chzhen is a quantitative researcher at the Centre for Research in Social Policy 
(CRSP).
Sue Middleton is Research Director at CRSP.
© Loughborough University, 2007
First published 2007 by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation
All rights reserved. Reproduction of this report by photocopying or electronic means for 
non-commercial purposes is permitted. Otherwise, no part of this report may be reproduced, 
adapted, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electronic, mechanical, 
photocopying, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation.
ISBN: 978 1 85935 606 7
A CIP catalogue record for this report is available from the British Library.
Prepared by:
York Publishing Services Ltd
64 Hallfi eld Road
Layerthorpe
York YO31 7ZQ
Tel: 01904 430033; Fax: 01904 430868; Website: www.yps-publishing.co.uk
Further copies of this report, or any other JRF publication, can be obtained from the JRF 
website (www.jrf.org.uk/bookshop/).
Contents
Acknowledgements vii
Executive summary viii
1 Introduction 1
Background 1
Policy context 3
Research objectives 4
Research design 5
Structure of the report 9
Report conventions 9
2 CTC/WTC and labour market participation and working hours of 
 women with children 10
Families eligible for tax credits in 2004–05 10
Family type and tax credit receipt 11
Activity status and tax credit receipt 16
Working hours, family type and tax credit receipt 18
Summary 19
3 Determinants of take-up of CTC and WTC 21
Determinants of take-up of CTC and WTC in 2004–05 21
Summary 26
4 The impact of CTC on labour market participation of women with 
 children 27
Average impact of CTC on labour market participation of women with 
children: PSM analysis 27
Effect of CTC on moving into work: transitions analysis 29
Effect of CTC on moving out of work: transitions analysis 32
Summary 34
5 The impact of WTC and CTC on working hours of women with children 36
Average effect of WTC on working hours of women with children: PSM 
analysis 36
Effect of WTC and CTC on working hours of women with children: dynamic 
analysis 38
Effect of WTC and CTC on moving from full-time to part-time work: 
transitions analysis 40
Summary 42
vi
6 Conclusions and implications 43
Take-up of CTC and WTC 44
The impact of CTC on labour market participation of women with children 45
The impact of WTC and CTC on working hours of women with children 46
Conclusion 47
Notes 48
References 51
Appendix 1: Defi ning eligibility for CTC and WTC for 2004–05 53
Appendix 2: Supplementary analysis 57
Appendix 3: Models specifi cation 65
vii
Acknowledgements
This report was undertaken by the Centre for Research in Social Policy (CRSP) and 
was commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF).
We would like to thank Chris Goulden, Principal Research Manager at the JRF, for 
his guidance throughout the project and for his feedback on the draft report. We 
are also grateful to members of the Project Advisory Group for their constructive 
comments and suggestions: Kate Bell, Mike Brewer, Nick Burkitt, Paul Dornan, 
Donald Hirsch, Lindsay Isaacs, Lindsey Jarvis and Elizabeth Rayner. We would also 
like to thank Professor Phil Robins for providing invaluable methodological support 
and feedback. Finally, particular thanks are owed to Dr Monica Magadi at CRSP 
for her advice on technical issues and to Nicola Selby at CRSP for administrative 
support to the project.
viii
Executive summary
The new tax credits Child Tax Credit (CTC) and Working Tax Credit (WTC) were 
introduced in the United Kingdom in April 2003 to support families with children, 
reduce child poverty and make work pay for those on low incomes. The credits are a 
central plank of the Labour Government’s ambitious policy of reducing and eventually 
abolishing child poverty. This report has investigated the labour market impact of the 
tax credits on labour market participation of women with children and explored the 
reasons for non-take-up of the tax credits among the eligible population. The study 
has used data from the three latest available rounds of interviews of the longitudinal 
Families and Children Study (FACS), 2002–05.
CTC and WTC are income-tested benefi ts that are administered by HM Revenue & 
Customs (HMRC). CTC supports families with dependent children, is paid directly to 
the main carer in the family (usually the mother) and does not depend directly on the 
family’s work status. WTC, on the other hand, is paid to income-eligible families with 
children, as well as to working people over 25 years old without children. WTC has 
a minimum working hours requirement – in addition to meeting other conditions for 
receipt of WTC, an adult responsible for a child has to work 16 hours or more a week 
to be eligible.
Take-up of CTC and WTC
Our best estimate of take-up in 2004–05 suggests that a quarter of CTC-eligible 
families were not receiving it and 41 per cent of families eligible for WTC were not 
getting it. However, the take-up rates produced using FACS were below the 2004–05 
take-up rates estimated by HMRC using a combination of survey and administrative 
data, which shows that administrative data tend to produce more accurate estimates 
of take-up than survey data alone (2007). According to FACS, among families eligible 
for CTC, lone parents were much more likely to be in receipt of CTC than mothers in 
couple families. Among families eligible for WTC, lone parents were also more likely 
to take it up.
Prior receipt of Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) – the predecessor of CTC 
and WTC – was a crucial predictor of take-up. CTC-eligible families who had been 
receiving WFTC in 2002–03 were almost twice as likely to take up CTC in 2004–05 
as families who had not been claiming WFTC, while WTC-eligible families were three 
times more likely to take up WTC if they had been claiming WFTC in 2002–03.
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CTC-eligible families with previous year’s equivalised household incomes in the 
highest quintile were signifi cantly less likely to take up CTC than other families. 
There were important differences by income among WTC-eligible families, however. 
Families with incomes in the second quintile were the most likely to take up WTC, 
while those with incomes in the fi rst and the third quintiles were only about half as 
likely to take it up. Families in the fourth quintile were one-third as likely and those in 
the fi fth quintile were only one-fi fth as likely to take up WTC as those in the second 
quintile.
Eligible families in the London area were the least likely to be receiving CTC and 
WTC in 2004–05. CTC-eligible families were half as likely to be receiving CTC as 
those in the North of England and WTC-eligible families were half as likely to be 
receiving WTC as eligible families in the North. However, entitlement level was not 
controlled for in this study because of various data limitations. Thus, the estimated 
effects of these background characteristics may be partly due to their correlation with 
entitlement level.
The impact of CTC on labour market participation of women 
with children
In 2004–05, estimated employment rates of lone parents who were receiving CTC 
were around 11 percentage points lower than the employment rates of eligible non-
recipients with a similar chance of receiving CTC. Mothers in couple families who 
were in receipt of CTC had an eight percentage point lower employment rate, on 
average, than comparable non-recipients.
From a dynamic perspective, after unobserved individual differences were accounted 
for but WTC receipt was not taken into account, CTC had no signifi cant effect on 
the likelihood of being in work in either 2003–04 or 2004–05. This may have been 
because the positive effect of WTC, which was not controlled for, balanced out the 
negative effect of CTC.
However, when yearly changes in activity status were analysed, CTC had a negative 
effect on the probability of moving into work for those who had not been working at 
the 2002–03 round of interviews and were not in receipt of WTC at any of the two 
subsequent interviews. The negative effect of CTC on the probability of moving into 
work was larger in magnitude for lone parents.
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CTC had a positive effect on the probability of moving out of work for lone parents 
who had been working at the time of the 2002–03 interview and were not in receipt 
of WTC at any of the two subsequent interviews, but a negative effect for mothers in 
couple families. Among CTC recipients, partnered mothers were substantially less 
likely to move out of work than lone parents, but there was no difference by family 
type among CTC non-recipients.
While there were no regional differences in the probability of moving into work, there 
were differences in the moving-out-of-work analysis. Women in the London area 
were more than twice as likely to move out of paid work than those in the North of 
England.
These results confi rm the theoretical prediction that CTC can only ever have a 
negative effect on labour market participation of women with children.
The impact of WTC and CTC on working hours of women with 
children
In 2004–05, lone parents who were receiving WTC worked around four hours less 
than eligible non-recipients with a similar likelihood of receiving WTC. Women in 
couple families with employed partners who received WTC worked a similar number 
of hours, on average, to comparable non-recipients.
When changes in working hours over time were examined, after unobserved 
individual differences were accounted for, neither WTC nor CTC had a signifi cant 
effect on working hours of women with children working 16 or more hours a week in 
2003–04 and 2004–05, and eligible for WTC (and CTC) in 2004–05.
For women with children eligible for WTC (and CTC) in 2004–05, neither WTC nor 
CTC had a signifi cant effect on the probability of moving from full-time work (30 or 
more hours a week) in 2002–03 to part-time work (between 16 and 29 hours) in 
any of the two subsequent years. Similarly, neither of the tax credits increased the 
chances of moving from part-time to full-time work among those who worked 16–29 
hours a week in 2002–03.
In the context of the fi nding that CTC had a negative effect on participation of women 
with children, especially of lone parents, it may seem surprising that the tax credits 
had little effect on working hours. However, only those who were working 16 or 
more hours a week before and after the tax credits were introduced were examined 
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in the working hours analysis. Thus, CTC did a relatively poor job of pushing non-
participating mothers into work (though, of course, this is not what CTC is supposed 
to do). For those who were already working and eligible for WTC, neither CTC nor 
WTC produced substantial changes in hours of work. This fi ts with the theoretical 
prediction that CTC is always a disincentive to work, while WTC is an incentive to 
reduce working hours, for those who are eligible for it.

11 Introduction
Background
Two new tax credits for families with dependent children, Child Tax Credit (CTC) and 
Working Tax Credit (WTC), were introduced in the United Kingdom in April 2003. 
The policy aim was to support families with children, reduce child poverty and make 
work pay for those on low incomes (HM Treasury, 2002). These credits are a central 
plank of the Labour Government’s ambitious policy of halving child poverty by 2010 
and abolishing it by 2020. Recent research has shown that increasing women’s 
labour market participation and high levels of take-up of the tax credits will be crucial 
to achieving these poverty targets (Hirsch, 2006). Therefore, this report examines 
the impact of the new tax credits on the labour market participation of women with 
children in Britain.
The fi rst point to note is that CTC and WTC are not ‘true’ tax credits in that they do 
not involve assessments for income tax purposes with the possibility of retrospective 
payments and/or reductions in tax liability, although they do follow the tax principle 
of an annual entitlement adjusted at the end of the year. Rather, CTC and WTC are 
income-tested benefi ts that are administered by HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC). 
CTC supports families with dependent children, is paid directly to the main carer in 
the family (usually the mother) and does not depend directly on the family’s work 
status. The intention was that CTC would integrate all income-related support for 
children in the UK, so that all families with children with gross incomes of up to 
£58,175 a year (or up to £66,350 a year if the family has a child under one year old) 
currently can claim CTC.1 Payments of CTC would be received from HMRC so that, 
for example, people in receipt of Income Support would now receive two payments: 
the adult element of Income Support from Job Centre Plus and CTC from HMRC. 
However, as we shall see, many families who were in receipt of Income Support prior 
to the introduction of tax credits and were still doing so in 2004–05 have not yet been 
‘migrated’ to CTC and are continuing to receive a single Income Support payment, 
which contains an element for children equal to their CTC entitlement, from Job 
Centre Plus.
WTC, on the other hand, is paid to income-eligible families with dependent children, 
as well as to working people over 25 years old without children. WTC has a minimum 
working hours requirement – in addition to meeting other conditions for receipt of 
WTC, an adult responsible for a child has to work 16 hours or more a week to be 
eligible. It used to be paid through the wage packet to the earner, but this method 
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of payment began to be phased out in November 2005. It is now paid directly to the 
claimant. WTC provides additional support for people without children working 30 or 
more hours per week, disabled people or people aged 50 or over who are returning 
to work after a period on benefi t. Parents in receipt of WTC can also receive a 
childcare element, which, as of April 2006, meets up to 80 per cent of the costs of 
eligible childcare, up to a maximum of £175 a week for one child and up to £300 a 
week in total for two or more children.
The effects of the new tax credits on the labour market participation of women 
with children have not yet been evaluated in depth. However, research on their 
predecessor, Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC), showed that WFTC had a 
sizeable positive impact on the labour supply of lone mothers and a small negative 
impact on the labour supply of mothers in couples, compared to the programme of 
fi nancial support it had replaced (Brewer and Browne, 2006; Brewer et al., 2006a). To 
qualify for WFTC a family with children had to have at least one adult in employment 
for at least 16 hours a week, which is currently a requirement for WTC, whereas 
entitlement to CTC does not depend on the family’s work status. Moreover, where 
benefi t entitlement is based on the household’s, rather than the individual’s, income 
the second earner in a couple, who is usually a woman, has fewer incentives to 
work when the benefi t level rises. Therefore, it might be expected that CTC would 
have a negative effect on the labour market participation of mothers, which may be 
counteracted by the positive effect of WTC, relative to a situation with no fi nancial 
support.
At the same time, it is not obvious what effect CTC and WTC may have on hours 
of work for those already employed. Not only is WTC withdrawn at the rate of 37 
per cent after the ‘fi rst income threshold’ (currently at £5,220), but WTC claimants 
may also be liable for National Insurance contributions and income tax, driving the 
effective marginal tax rate (the tax rate on the last pound of taxable income) up to 
70 per cent. However, the disregard of increases in income of up to £2,500 a year 
(increased to £25,000 from April 2006) means that claimants do not actually face 
such high marginal tax rates at the time when their gross pay increases. A change 
in the marginal tax rate may have an ambiguous impact on the number of hours 
worked, as the ‘income effect’ (an increase in real wages leading to an increase in 
consumption of ‘leisure’, hence a decrease in the hours worked) and the ‘substitution 
effect’ (an increase in real wages causes an increase in hours worked) will work in 
different directions (Blundell et al., 2000). For instance, Mulheirn and Pisani (2006) 
found that, since its introduction in 2003, WTC had a small negative effect on working 
hours, but a positive effect on labour supply, for childless claimants over the age of 
25. There is no similar analysis of the WTC effect for women with children at the time 
of this study.
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At the same time, not everybody entitled to a benefi t/tax credit claims it. According 
to HM Revenue & Customs estimates for 2003–04, the take-up rates were 79 per 
cent for CTC and 56 per cent for WTC (HMRC, 2006). Although economic research 
on what determines take-up is relatively scarce, several studies have modelled take-
up of tax credits using survey data and have identifi ed characteristics associated 
with take-up (see Brewer, 2003). Adam and Brewer (2005), for instance, examined 
the determinants of WFTC take-up and found that the higher the amount of WFTC 
to which families were entitled, the higher the take-up by couples and lone parents. 
Lone parents were also less likely to claim WFTC if they were better educated, 
homeowners or lone fathers, controlling for earnings and entitlement level. Brewer 
et al. (2006a) modelled labour supply and take-up of WFTC simultaneously, as did 
Bingley and Walker (1997) in their analysis of labour supply of lone mothers and their 
participation in Family Credit (predecessor of WFTC).
Policy context
This study aims to inform the current Government’s strategy of reducing and 
eventually abolishing child poverty. Although out-of-work benefi ts can provide 
important support to workless households with children – and, arguably, will need 
to be increased if child poverty is to be ‘abolished’ – there is also a need for more 
people to participate in paid employment, as children living in families where all 
adults are working have the lowest chances of being income poor. (This, of course, 
ignores questions of whether it is better for children’s emotional development to live 
in households where all adults are working or, indeed, issues of parental choice and 
work–life balance.)
In fact, the likely effects of the new tax credits on mothers’ labour market 
participation, relative to a situation with no tax credits, are not clear. While the 
minimum working hours requirement of WTC may induce recipients to work more 
hours, CTC eligibility rules do not require paid employment. Therefore, CTC may 
reduce employment incentives, especially for second earners in families who may 
prefer to spend more time with their children. While providing work–life balance 
‘choice’, this would contradict the policy of promoting paid work as the main route out 
of poverty. Since a larger proportion of families with children receive CTC than WTC 
(families with children who receive WTC always receive CTC as well), it may be of 
interest to attempt to separate out the labour market impact of CTC from that of the 
WTC, even though the two tax credits were designed to work together.
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This study aims to contribute to understanding of the labour supply impact of the 
new tax credits by investigating their effects and possible limitations in meeting the 
Government’s target of ending child poverty. Furthermore, as recent research by the 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation on the future of child poverty policy indicates, take-up 
will be crucial if tax credits are to remain the main vehicle for ending child poverty 
(Hirsch, 2006). To inform current and future policy, this project aims to identify the 
reasons why some of the entitled families are more likely to claim the new tax credits 
than others.
Research objectives
The study had two broad aims, each of which had specifi c objectives.
1 To evaluate the effects of CTC and WTC on labour market participation and 
working hours of mothers in lone-parent and couple families, compared to a 
situation of no fi nancial support.
n To estimate the impact of CTC on the labour market participation of women 
with children – the probability of being in paid work.
n To estimate the impact of WTC and CTC on the working hours of women with 
children.
n To evaluate the effect of CTC on the likelihood of making a transition from 
non-participation in the labour market to employment and vice versa for 
women with children.
n To evaluate the effect of WTC and CTC on the likelihood of making a transition 
from part-time employment of 16–29 hours a week to ‘full-time’ employment of 
30 or more hours a week and vice versa for women with children.
2 To explore the reasons for non-take-up of the new tax credits.
n To identify the eligible population based on relevant eligibility criteria.
n To single out factors associated with an increased likelihood of take-up and 
non-take-up of CTC and WTC separately, among those eligible.
With respect to the fi rst main objective, we expect CTC to have a negative effect on 
participation of women with children and, conditional on working, a negative effect 
on hours worked. We also expect WTC to have a negative effect on hours worked, 
though not so much as to lose eligibility for WTC. There may, however, be a positive 
effect of the 30-hour premium, for those who work between 16 and 29 hours on very 
low wages (see Appendix 1, Figure A1.1).
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Research design
Data
The study has used data from the three latest available rounds of interviews of the 
Families and Children Study (FACS). FACS is a ‘refreshed’2 panel survey that started 
in 1999, commissioned by the Department for Work and Pensions. Since 2001, 
FACS has been a representative sample of all families with dependent children 
in Britain and provides a wealth of information on the contemporary situation of 
families with children, including employment, income and benefi ts data. Information 
is available about receipt of CTC and WTC at the household level.3 The main 
respondents in households are usually women. For this study, the family-level dataset 
has been restricted to working-age women with one or more children in the family. 
Furthermore, in order to focus on the labour market behaviour of mothers who do not 
face additional constraints on their ability to participate in the labour market, those 
in full-time education or receiving Incapacity Benefi t or Disability Living Allowance 
were removed.4 Therefore, the sample consisted of households with dependent 
children where women were 16–59 years old. Data collection for the fourth round 
of interviews (Wave 4) was conducted from September 2002 to February 2003, 
followed by the fi fth and the sixth rounds of interviews (Wave 5 and Wave 6) one and 
two years later (2003–04 and 2004–05).
A diffi culty arises in defi ning those households in the sample who were in receipt of 
CTC, particularly among those who were in receipt of Income Support (IS) or non-
contributory Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) in April 2003 when the tax credits were 
introduced. The original intention of Government was that these households would 
continue to receive payments for their children in IS payments until April 2004 when 
they would be ‘migrated’ to the Child Tax Credit. At this point they would receive two 
payments: the adult element of IS or JSA from Job Centre Plus and their Child Tax 
Credit payment from HMRC. They would then be aware that they were receiving 
a tax credit for their children. However, it is our understanding that, because of 
administrative diffi culties, most families in receipt of IS or JSA in April 2003, and 
who continued to receive IS, had still not been migrated to CTC by 2005 (or, indeed, 
to date).5 These families would not, therefore, fi nd themselves in receipt of CTC, 
although their incomes would have increased with the introduction of CTC and, 
subsequently, as further increases were made (thereby contributing to the policy aim 
of reducing child poverty).
Defi ning these families in the analysis as not being in receipt of CTC would be strictly 
correct, but would infl ate the positive impact of CTC on labour market participation 
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by omitting a sizeable group of non-workers on IS or JSA from the group of CTC 
recipients. Moreover, this would also exaggerate the impact of CTC on labour market 
entry because only those in receipt of Income Support who had claimed it since April 
2003 would be counted as CTC recipients and these relatively short-term claimants 
could be anticipated to be the most likely to (re-)enter work (Shaw et al., 1996). On 
the other hand, the work incentive aim of the policy might suggest that those who 
were not receiving CTC would be less likely to become aware of WTC and, therefore, 
be less likely to enter work. This would suggest defi ning those who were in receipt of 
IS or JSA before 2003 as non-recipients of CTC for the purposes of our analysis. Our 
decision was to defi ne all IS claimants and all JSA claimants where neither partner 
is in work as recipients of CTC.6 This approach avoids exaggeration of the impact of 
CTC on labour market participation, but these reservations about the data and how 
the work incentive aims of the policy might operate should be borne in mind in what 
follows.
Methods
A range of analytical methods have been used in this study. Obviously, the more 
consistent the results of these different techniques, the more we can rely on the 
robustness of our conclusions.
Point-in-time analysis
Since the new tax credits have already been rolled out nationally and have strict 
eligibility criteria, it is no longer possible to conduct an experiment where one 
randomly selected group would receive the tax credits and another would not. 
A common problem in non-experimental evaluation research is to identify a 
comparison group that is similar to those who experienced a policy intervention on 
all characteristics except the intervention itself. Propensity score matching (PSM) 
can help solve this problem, as it allows the choice of a comparison group that has 
very similar observed characteristics to the group that was subjected to the policy 
intervention (Becker and Ichino, 2002). This method summarises the characteristics 
of each individual into a single propensity score (the probability of receiving the 
policy intervention), on the basis of which matching is performed between individuals 
receiving the intervention (in this case the tax credits) and individuals not receiving 
the intervention.
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PSM was employed to estimate the impact of CTC on labour market participation 
and the impact of WTC on hours worked, using data from the sixth round of 
interviews in FACS, 2004–05. PSM may be appropriate for estimating the effects 
of CTC on mothers’ labour market participation because it allows the construction 
of a comparison group (‘entitled non-recipients’) that is similar to the treated group 
(recipients) on the eligibility criteria (e.g. earnings) and entitlement-level criteria (e.g. 
number of children). It also allows other individual and household characteristics 
that might be expected to affect labour market outcomes to be taken into account, 
since information was collected in the FACS survey before the introduction of the 
tax credits between September 2002 and February 2003 (observed pre-treatment 
characteristics). Therefore, comparing those who differ only on whether they are 
receiving the tax credits or not and who have been matched on other characteristics 
should make it possible to estimate the average effect of CTC or WTC on the 
recipients’ labour market behaviour. However, the limitation of PSM is that it 
cannot take account of things that affect labour market outcomes but about which 
information was not collected (e.g. innate motivation to work). If recipients and non-
recipients differ on such unobservable characteristics and these differences also 
affect some of the variables included in the analysis, PSM results may be biased. 
For example, if those who are more likely to claim CTC are less motivated to work in 
general, receipt of CTC would appear to have a negative effect on the likelihood of 
being in paid employment if motivation to work was not controlled for. However, there 
is no research evidence that this is likely to be the case with CTC.
Dynamic analysis
While it is very diffi cult to account for characteristics about which we have no 
information using cross-sectional data, it may be feasible with panel data.7 Since 
FACS is a panel dataset with two years’ worth of information on the new tax credits 
for the vast majority of the interviewed households, it is possible to estimate 
‘consistently’8 the effects of the tax credits on labour market participation and hours 
of work of women with children. To account for those individual characteristics about 
which we do not have information, such as innate motivation to work (‘unobservable 
individual effects’), but which may be correlated with the labour market outcomes and 
with other observed characteristics, such as the receipt of CTC and WTC, this study 
has used fi xed-effects linear and logistic panel models.9 These models use changes 
in individuals’ characteristics over time to estimate the effects of independent 
variables (such as receipt of tax credits, age of youngest child, income) on the 
dependent variable (participation, working hours). Thus, things about individuals that 
may change from one round of interviews to the next (e.g. number of children in the 
household) are used in the estimation, while the things that stay constant (e.g. ethnic 
8The impact of tax credits on mothers’ employment
origin), including ‘unobserved individual effects’ that are assumed not to vary from 
one round of interviews to the next, will drop out.
Another way to evaluate the effect of CTC and WTC on mothers’ labour market 
participation and hours of work, using the panel element of FACS, is to analyse 
transitions (e.g. from non-participation to employment; from full-time work to part-
time work), conditional on the receipt of the tax credits as well as other individual 
and household characteristics. Since only two years of information on the tax credits 
was available, a ‘discrete-time’ logistic regression model was used. Unfortunately, 
accurate monthly information on duration of receipt of the new tax credits was not 
available for a substantial proportion of the sample, so yearly periods were used 
instead. Analysing yearly changes in activity status and the receipt of the tax credits 
makes it diffi cult to disentangle the sequence of events within each year (e.g. starting 
to receive CTC/WTC and becoming employed). This does not allow fi rm conclusions 
to be reached about causality between receipt of the tax credits and labour market 
behaviour of women with children.
Moreover, the literature on the labour market impact of WFTC suggests that labour 
supply and take-up decisions are made at the same time. To take account of the 
joint nature of these decisions a structural model of labour supply and programme 
participation would have to be used (see Brewer et al., 2006a). However, this method 
was not feasible in the present study because of the relatively small sample size 
of FACS. Therefore, this project has taken advantage of the panel nature of FACS 
to investigate labour supply decisions of women with children conditional on take-
up or non-take-up of the tax credits in a dynamic perspective, keeping in mind the 
limitations of not modelling labour supply and take-up decisions jointly.
Alternatively, it would have been possible to use the ‘difference-in-differences’ 
methodology to identify the impact of the introduction of the new tax credits in 2003 
by comparing the labour market outcomes for those who have been affected by 
the policy change with the outcomes for those to whom the policy change had not 
applied (e.g. childless people under 25 years old). Because FACS covers families 
without children for only one year after children left the household or stopped being 
dependent, the sample size of families without children, who could constitute a 
suitable comparison group, is not large enough for the ‘differences-in-differences’ 
approach. Moreover, it would have to be assumed that macroeconomic fl uctuations 
affect the labour market chances of women with children and childless women 
similarly, which may not be the case.
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Structure of the report
Chapter 2 describes the activity status and working hours of recipients and non-
recipients of the new tax credits separately for lone parents and those in couple 
families (with working and non-working partners). The aim here is simply to set the 
scene for the more complex modelling that follows in subsequent chapters and so the 
fi ndings should not be treated as defi nitive. Chapter 3 identifi es the characteristics 
of families with children who are more likely to take up the new tax credits among 
those who are eligible to receive them on income grounds and, for WTC take-up 
analysis, on income and working hours grounds. Chapter 4 analyses the relationship 
between receipt of the new tax credits and the labour market participation of women 
with children, controlling for other relevant personal and family characteristics of 
women with children and using both point-in-time (cross-sectional) and dynamic 
(panel) techniques. Chapter 5 investigates the relationship between hours of work 
and receipt of the new tax credits. Chapter 6 summarises the fi ndings and discusses 
policy recommendations.
Report conventions
n Throughout the report, percentages based on fewer than 50 cases are enclosed 
in square brackets and should be interpreted with caution (those based on fewer 
than ten cases are not presented and are shown as [–]).
n All percentages are weighted by either cross-sectional or longitudinal weights 
provided with the FACS dataset, while number of cases refl ect unweighted base 
populations.
n Percentages are rounded up or down to one decimal place and therefore may not 
always sum to 100.
n Percentages less than 0.5 are shown as ‘*’ to distinguish them from absolute 0.
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2 CTC/WTC and labour market 
participation and working hours of 
women with children
This chapter describes the relationship between receipt of the new tax credits 
and the labour market behaviour of women with children, setting the scene for 
more complex analysis in the next three chapters. Using only descriptive methods, 
activity status and working hours of recipients and non-recipients of CTC and WTC 
are compared for lone parents and mothers in couple families. The analysis used 
information from the sixth round of interviews of FACS (2004–05), so receipt of the 
tax credits was based on survey data and not administrative records.1 Since the 
methods in this chapter are purely descriptive, the fi ndings in relation to receipt of tax 
credits, labour market participation and working hours are not conclusive. Moreover, 
the cross-sectional nature of this analysis does not allow us to ascertain whether 
participation and working hours are infl uencing the take-up of tax credits as a result 
of income and working hours eligibility criteria, or whether this is working in the other 
direction, that is, receipt of tax credits is infl uencing participation and working hours.
Families eligible for tax credits in 2004–05
The initial tax credits award is based on household income in the year before the 
application is made. Thus, information from the 2003–04 round of interviews was 
used to identify families who were income eligible during the 2004–05 round of 
interviews, based on the defi nition of income used by HMRC to assess eligibility for 
tax credits.2 The following sources of income were taken into account to derive the 
‘2003–04 weekly household pre-tax income from earnings and taxable social security 
benefi ts’:
n respondent’s earnings and/or income from self-employment
n partner’s earnings and/or income from self-employment (if partner is present)
n Statutory Sick Pay
n Invalid Care Allowance
n Statutory Maternity Pay
11
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n Bereavement Allowance (formerly Widow’s Pension)
n Jobseeker’s Allowance
n retirement pension
n Incapacity Benefi t3
n investment income (assuming 3 per cent annual return on all savings) in excess 
of £300 per year
n other regular household income.
To determine a family’s eligibility for CTC, the maximum CTC award was estimated 
fi rst. At the taxable income level above £5,060 a year, the elements of CTC apart 
from the ‘family element’ and the ‘baby addition’ were tapered at the rate of 37 per 
cent (fast taper). At the same time, all families with dependent children with taxable 
incomes below £50,0004 were entitled to the full ‘family element’ of CTC (and the 
‘baby addition’, where applicable). Families with incomes above this threshold had 
their remaining CTC tapered away at the rate of 6.7 per cent (slow taper). Families 
whose CTC entitlement was not tapered away entirely were considered eligible for 
CTC in this analysis. Four per cent (204 unweighted cases) of the remaining 2004–
05 sample appeared to be ineligible for CTC on income grounds and were excluded 
from the analysis. Thus, the fi nal sample consisted only of families with children 
identifi ed as eligible for CTC.
To be eligible for WTC, a family needs to satisfy both the minimum working hours 
and income criteria. Therefore, at least one parent has to be in paid work of 16 
or more hours a week. Those among the working hours eligible families whose 
estimated maximum WTC entitlement exceeded 37 per cent of ‘excess income’ were 
considered eligible for WTC. Of course, all families eligible for WTC were also eligible 
for CTC, but the opposite is not necessarily true. For a more detailed description of 
how the maximum tax credits entitlement was calculated and how CTC and WTC 
eligibility was established see Appendix 1.
Family type and tax credit receipt
This section compares estimated take-up rates of the new tax credits of lone-parent 
and couple families who were found to be eligible for CTC in 2004–05. Identifi cation 
12
The impact of tax credits on mothers’ employment
of those in receipt of the tax credits was based on the household’s response to a 
survey question about current receipt of CTC and WTC. However, as was explained 
in Chapter 1, Income Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants who had not 
reported receipt of CTC were also counted as CTC recipients for the purposes of 
the analysis. In 2004–05, such cases constituted 12 per cent of all CTC recipients 
(34 per cent among lone parents and 23 per cent among families with non-working 
partners).
The majority of families with dependent children (75 per cent) who were eligible 
for CTC were receiving either CTC only or both of the new tax credits in 2004–05 
(Table 1).5 This is close to the take-up rate of 82 per cent estimated by HM Revenue 
& Customs using a combination of survey and administrative data (HMRC, 2007). 
However, one-quarter of families eligible for CTC (25 per cent) were not receiving 
any of the tax credits, which appears to be somewhat high. It may be that FACS, 
like the Family Resources Survey (FRS), under-reports the numbers in receipt of 
the tax credits (Brewer et al., 2006b). Thus, some actual recipients may have been 
misclassifi ed as non-recipients in FACS. This may have implications for the analysis 
of labour market participation and working hours that uses eligible non-recipients as 
the comparison group (Chapters 4 and 5). Though the extent of the problem should 
not be large, the estimated labour market effects of the new tax credits need to be 
interpreted with caution throughout this report.
Rates of receipt of the new tax credits differed by family type and whether the partner 
was in paid work (Table 1). Lone parents were the group most likely to receive either 
both CTC and WTC or CTC only (92 per cent), by comparison with mothers in couple 
families with working partners (69 per cent) and those with non-working partners (82 
per cent). Lone parents were also more likely to receive WTC (in conjunction with 
CTC) than mothers in other family types. Mothers with non-working partners were the 
group most likely to receive CTC on its own. However, the differences by family type 
are not conclusive, since various other important characteristics were not controlled 
for.
Table 1  Receipt of new tax credits by family type in 2004–05
New Tax Credits  Column percentages
 Lone  With working  With non-working
 parent partner partner Total
Neither 7.7 31.3 17.7 24.8
Both 38.0 17.3 20.7 22.6
CTC only 54.4 51.4 61.6 52.6
N 1,483 3,607 230 5,320
Base: working-age women with dependent children who were eligible for CTC and participated in both 
2003–04 and 2004–05 rounds of interviews.
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Since IS and JSA claimants who had not reported receipt of CTC were counted as 
CTC recipients in this study, it is of interest to estimate take-up rates of CTC solely 
for families who have not reported receipt of IS or JSA. Among these families, a 
higher proportion of lone parents received neither of the tax credits (13 per cent) or 
both (63 per cent) (Table 2) than among all CTC-eligible respondents, where 8 per 
cent of lone parents received neither CTC nor WTC and 38 per cent received both 
(Table 1). At the same time, 24 per cent of CTC-eligible lone parents not in receipt 
of IS or JSA were receiving CTC only, compared with 54 per cent of all CTC-eligible 
lone parents. This pattern is as expected, since IS and JSA recipients are not in work 
and so cannot claim WTC. Thus, rates of receipt of tax credits were similar among 
families with working partners in both analyses, since less than 1 per cent of them 
were in receipt of IS or JSA.
Table 3 illustrates important differences in tax credit receipt by activity status for 
each family type. Among lone parents, those who worked 16 or more hours a week 
were the most likely to receive both CTC and WTC, while those who worked under 
16 hours or were out of work were the most likely to receive CTC only. This is not 
surprising, since CTC does not have a working hours requirement, while WTC does. 
Among mothers with working partners, however, the picture was mixed. Those who 
worked 16–29 hours a week were most likely to be receiving CTC only, which may 
indicate that their family incomes were too high to be eligible for WTC. Interestingly, 
non-working mothers with working partners were more likely to receive both CTC 
and WTC than those working 16 or more hours. This may be due to the fact that their 
working partners were receiving WTC, while families where both parents were in 
work were less likely to be receiving WTC because of too high (joint) family incomes. 
However, without controlling for household income and other relevant characteristics, 
these results are not conclusive.
Table 2  Receipt of new tax credits by family type in 2004–05 among families not 
claiming Income Support or Jobseeker’s Allowance
New Tax Credits  Column percentages
 Lone  With working  With non-working
 parent partner partner Total
Neither 12.9 31.4 27.5 28.1
Both 63.3 17.4 31.5 25.6
CTC only 23.8 51.2 40.9 46.2
N 875 3,589 143 4,607
Base: working-age women with dependent children, not in receipt of IS or JSA, who were eligible for 
CTC and participated in both 2003–04 and 2004–05 rounds of interviews.
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Table 3  Receipt of new tax credits by family type and activity status in 2004–2005
Work status  Row percentages within categories
 Does not  Receives 
 receive new both CTC Receives
 tax credits and WTC CTC only N
Lone parent
30 or more hours 17.6 52.1 30.3 395
16–29 hours 4.9 83.4 11.7 417
1–15 hours 9.1 5.5 85.5 60
Not in work 2.8 0.9 96.3 611
Total 7.7 38.0 54.4 1,483
With working partner
30 or more hours 38.7 11.5 49.8 1,187
16–29 hours 27.4 15.1 57.5 1,123
1–15 hours 33.2 15.3 51.5 473
Not in work 24.6 29.9 45.5 824
Total 31.3 17.3 51.4 3,607
With non-working partner
30 or more hours 31.3 18.8 50.0 59
16–29 hours [20.0] [64.4] [15.6] 44
1–15 hours [13.3] [13.3] [73.3] 14
Not in work 9.2 4.6 86.2 113
Total 17.6 20.6 61.8 230
Base: working-age women with dependent children who were eligible for CTC and participated in both 
2003–04 and 2004–05 rounds of interviews.
Table 3 also shows that small numbers of lone parents and mothers with non-working 
partners who were not in work or working less than 16 hours a week reported receipt 
of both CTC and WTC. Since WTC has a minimum working hours requirement, 
these cases must be due to measurement error. It may also be the case that some of 
these families continued receiving WTC though they were no longer eligible for it, or 
perhaps they were not sure which tax credits they were receiving.
Among families eligible for CTC who reported receiving CTC but not WTC, the 
majority (62 per cent) had incomes too high to be eligible for WTC even though they 
satisfi ed the minimum working hours requirement (Table 4). One-quarter (24.5 per 
cent) failed the working hours requirement, irrespective of income. Interestingly, 14 
per cent of families receiving CTC only appeared to also be eligible for WTC based 
on both working hours and income criteria but were not taking it up. Since eligibility 
for CTC and WTC was determined using FACS, and not accurate administrative 
records, the eligible sample could not be identifi ed with perfect precision. However, 
these results still suggest that WTC take-up among CTC recipients eligible for both 
tax credits was incomplete.
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There were important differences by family type. Unsurprisingly, couple families 
where partner was in paid work were the most likely (85 per cent) to have been 
income ineligible for WTC. They were also more likely (15 per cent) than other family 
types not to be taking up WTC, though eligible for it, while in receipt of CTC. Lone 
parents were the most likely (79 per cent) to receive CTC but not WTC because they 
did not satisfy the minimum working hours requirement for WTC.
More than half (59 per cent) of families with dependent children who appeared to 
be eligible for WTC on both working hours and income grounds were in receipt of 
WTC (Table 5). This take-up rate for 2004–05 is below the take-up rate of 94 per cent 
estimated for families with children using a combination of survey and administrative 
data by HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC, 2006). The disparity in the estimated 
take-up rates points to the fact that administrative data tend to be more likely to 
produce more accurate estimates of take-up than survey data alone. However, 
the methodologies used to estimate these take-up rates differed substantially. 
For example, unlike in the HMRC analysis, where CTC-only recipients who also 
appeared to be eligible for WTC were counted as recipients of both tax credits, in the 
current study only those who reported WTC receipt were counted as WTC recipients.
Table 4  Reasons for receipt of CTC only by family type in 2004–05
 Column percentages
  With With  
 Lone working  non-working
 parent partner partner Total
Not taking up WTC 12.7 14.7 11.9 14.1
Income too high for WTC 8.4 84.8 15.4 61.5
Not working 16 or more hours 78.8 * 72.7 24.5
N 804 1,858 145 2,807
Base: working-age women with dependent children who were receiving CTC only and participated in 
both 2003–04 and 2004–05 rounds of interviews.
Table 5  Receipt of WTC by family type in 2004–05
Receives WTC Column percentages
  With With  
 Lone working  non-working
 parent partner partner Total
No 22.9 55.9 39.1 41.4
Yes 77.1 44.1 60.9 58.6
N 697 800 63 1,560
Base: working-age women with dependent children who were eligible for WTC and participated in both 
2003–04 and 2004–05 rounds of interviews.
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There were substantial differences in take-up by family type, however. Lone parents 
were the most likely to take up WTC (77 per cent), compared with 44 per cent of 
families with working partner. Yet, this pattern has to be interpreted with caution 
because various important background characteristics were not controlled for in this 
analysis.
Activity status and tax credit receipt
This section compares activity status of recipients of tax credits and non-recipients 
from income-eligible lone-parent and couple families. It begins by examining the 
work status of women in different family types and then describes their work status 
taking into account their receipt (or not) of tax credits. However, since the analysis in 
this chapter is cross-sectional, it is impossible to establish the direction of causality 
between receipt of the tax credits and labour market participation or working hours, 
since the sequence of events (starting to receive the tax credits and changing activity 
status or working hours) cannot be taken into account.
Lone parents in the UK have been less likely historically to be in paid work 
than mothers in couple families and one of the main issues for the child poverty 
policy agenda has been, and remains, how to encourage more lone parents into 
employment. As expected, mothers with working partners had generally higher rates 
of employment than lone parents, although the differences were largest for ‘part-time’ 
employment of under 16 hours a week (Table 6). Only 4 per cent of lone parents 
worked under 16 hours a week, compared to 13 per cent of those with working 
partners and 7 per cent of mothers with non-working partners. Even though, overall, 
the association between family type and work status was statistically signifi cant, lone 
parents’ rate of employment of 16–29 hours a week (28 per cent) was only slightly 
lower than that of mothers with working partners (31 per cent), but higher than that of 
mothers with non-working partners (19 per cent).
Once receipt of the new tax credits was controlled for, a somewhat different picture 
emerged about participation and working hours. Among the families eligible for CTC 
but not receiving any of the tax credits, lone parents were more likely than mothers 
with working partners to work 30 or more hours a week but less likely to work 16–29 
hours a week (Table 7). This pattern may suggest that employed lone parents who 
are eligible for CTC (and possibly WTC) but not claiming the tax credits tend to work 
longer hours than mothers with working partners for fi nancial reasons. Or, those who 
work longer hours are less likely to take up tax credits, possibly because the money 
they are missing out on is lower.
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Table 6  Work status and family type of women eligible for CTC in 2004–05
Work status Column percentages
  With With  
 Lone working  non-working
 parent partner partner Total
Working 30 or more hours/week 27.4 33.2 27.6 31.5
Working 16–29 hours/week 27.7 30.7 19.4 29.5
Working 1–15 hours/week 4.1 13.3 6.5 10.7
Not working 40.8 22.8 46.6 28.4
N 1,483 3,607 230 5,320
Base: working-age women with dependent children who were eligible for CTC and participated in both 
2003–04 and 2004–05 rounds of interviews.
Table 7  Work status by CTC receipt and family type in 2004–05
Work status Column percentages within categories
  With With  
 Lone working  non-working
 parent partner partner Total
Does not receive new tax credits
30 or more hours 62.7 41.1 [48.8] 43.0
16–29 hours 17.6 26.9 [22.0] 26.0
1–15 hours 4.9 14.1 [4.9] 13.1
Not in work 14.7 18.0 [24.4] 17.9
N 106 1,101 36 1,243
Receives both CTC and WTC
30 or more hours 37.5 22.1 [25.0] 28.7
16–29 hours 60.9 26.7 [60.4] 42.5
1–15 hours 0.6 11.7 [4.2] 6.8
Not in work 1.0 39.4 [10.4] 22.1
N 573 648 49 1,270
Receives CTC only
30 or more hours 15.2 32.2 22.2 27.3
16–29 hours 6.0 34.3 4.9 25.5
1–15 hours 6.5 13.3 7.6 11.3
Not in work 72.3 20.2 65.3 36.0
N 804 1,858 145 2,807
Base: working-age women with dependent children who were eligible for CTC and participated in both 
2003–04 and 2004–05 rounds of interviews.
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Among those who received both CTC and WTC, lone parents were more likely to 
work both 30 or more hours a week and 16–29 hours a week than mothers in couple 
families. Since it is joint family income that is assessed for eligibility of tax credits, 
lone parents working 16 or more hours are more likely to be eligible for both CTC 
and WTC than mothers with working partners who work similar hours but have 
higher family incomes. Among those who received CTC only, however, lone parents 
were less likely to work 16 or more hours a week than mothers with working partners. 
This may be refl ecting different reasons why families were receiving CTC but not 
WTC (see Table 4 earlier in this chapter). Lone parents working 16 or more hours 
may have been eligible for WTC but were not taking it up, while mothers with working 
partners were more likely to be income ineligible for WTC. However, it is important 
to note that these patterns may be explained by differences in household income 
or other background characteristics, which were not controlled for in this particular 
analysis.
Working hours, family type and tax credit receipt
This section compares the average working hours of women with children who were 
eligible for CTC in 2004–05 by family type, separately for all those who were in work 
and for those who worked 16 or more hours a week.
Table 8 shows that, among all those employed, lone parents who received neither of 
the tax credits had a signifi cantly longer average working week (35 hours) than those 
who received both of the tax credits (27 hours) or CTC only (28 hours). Similarly, 
mothers with working partners who received neither of the tax credits worked 
signifi cantly longer on average (29 hours a week) than those who received both CTC 
and WTC or CTC only (26 hours).
Table 8  Working hours, family type and tax credit receipt in 2004–05
Receipt of new  Group means (unweighted N)
tax credits All in work Those who worked 16 
  or more hours a week
  With With non-  With  With non-
 Lone working working  Lone working working
 parent partner partner parent partner partner
Neither 34.9 (90) 28.6 (904) [33.1] (27) 35.7 (87) 32.0 (758) [35.3] (24)
Both 26.5 (566) 25.8 (391) [24.4] (44) 26.6 (563) 29.0 (324) [25.5] (42)
CTC only 27.5 (215) 26.2 (1478) [29.50] (46) 34.2 (161) 29.1 (1249) [34.9] (36)
All 27.7 (871) 26.9 (2773) [28.6] (111) 29.2 (811) 30.1 (2331) 31.4 (102)
Base: working-age women with dependent children who were eligible for CTC and participated in both 
2003–04 and 2004–05 rounds of interviews.
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Among those who worked 16 or more hours a week, and so may have been eligible 
for WTC, lone parents who received neither of the tax credits (36 hours) and those 
who received CTC only (34 hours) worked signifi cantly longer on average than 
those who received both CTC and WTC (27 hours a week). As in the whole sample, 
mothers with working partners still worked the longest hours if they received neither 
of the tax credits than if they received both or CTC only. However, it is diffi cult to draw 
conclusions about the relationship between receipt of the tax credits and working 
hours without controlling for other important characteristics that may infl uence labour 
market behaviour. For instance, the fact that, for all family types, non-recipients of the 
tax credits worked consistently longer hours on average may be the result of their 
higher household incomes and, hence, reduced incentives to claim the tax credits.
Summary
n Take-up of the new tax credits in 2004–05 was incomplete. According to FACS, a 
quarter of CTC-eligible families were not receiving it and 41 per cent of families 
eligible for WTC were not getting it. Non-take-up rates estimated by HMRC (2007) 
were lower, however.
n Lone parents were most likely to receive either CTC on its own or in conjunction 
with WTC, in comparison with mothers in couple families.
n Among families eligible for CTC who reported receiving CTC but not WTC, the 
majority had incomes too high to be eligible for WTC even though they satisfi ed 
the minimum working hours requirement. One-quarter failed the working hours 
requirement, irrespective of income, while the rest (14 per cent) appeared to be 
eligible for WTC based on both working hours and income criteria but were not 
taking it up.
n Among families eligible to receive WTC, lone parents were the most likely to take 
it up.
n Among those who received both CTC and WTC, lone parents were more likely 
to work 30 or more hours a week and 16–29 hours a week than mothers in 
couple families. Among those who received CTC only, however, lone parents 
were substantially less likely to work 16 or more hours a week than mothers with 
working partners.
n Women with children were more likely to work 30 or more hours a week if they 
received neither of the tax credits and were more likely to work 16–29 hours a 
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week if they received both CTC and WTC, especially among lone parents and 
mothers with non-working partners.
n Among all those employed and those who worked 16 or more hours a week, 
women with children who received neither of the tax credits had a signifi cantly 
longer average working week than those who received both of the tax credits or 
CTC only.
n The analysis in this chapter did not control for various important eligibility-related 
and other background characteristics, so all the fi ndings with respect to tax 
credit receipt and labour market participation are inconclusive. Due to the cross-
sectional nature of this analysis, it is impossible to establish the direction of 
causality between tax credit receipt and participation or working hours.
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3 Determinants of take-up of CTC and 
WTC
If the Government is to achieve its child poverty targets, high rates of take-up of the 
tax credits will be required (Hirsch, 2006). Initial estimates of take-up in 2003–04 
showed that 21 per cent of the eligible population were not claiming CTC and 44 per 
cent were not claiming WTC, though, among eligible families with children, 12 per 
cent were not claiming WTC (HMRC, 2006). Descriptive analysis in Chapter 2, based 
on the 2004–05 FACS data, has shown that 25 per cent of families with children who 
were identifi ed as eligible for CTC and 41 per cent of families identifi ed as eligible 
for WTC were not receiving these tax credits. Therefore, to try to shed some light 
on the reasons for non-take-up of the new tax credits, this chapter investigates the 
characteristics that affect the likelihood of receipt of CTC and WTC among families 
who were apparently eligible. True take-up rates for the population are not estimated 
(i.e. entitled recipients as a proportion of all entitled), since the eligible sample is 
identifi ed with some degree of error using survey data that does not contain precise 
information on income, benefi ts and childcare costs, and without using matched 
administrative data. Moreover, entitlement levels were not estimated because of the 
above data limitations.1 This chapter presents a simple model of receipt of tax credits 
in 2004–05, separately for the samples eligible for CTC and for WTC.
Determinants of take-up of CTC and WTC in 2004–05
Regression analysis was used to predict the probability of receiving CTC (WTC) for 
eligible groups with different personal and family characteristics. Since the dependent 
variables of interest consist of two discrete and mutually exclusive categories – i.e. 
receiving CTC (WTC) or not receiving CTC (WTC) – binary logistic regression 
analysis was most suitable. Table 9 shows the results from such a model of receipt 
of tax credits for women with children from families eligible for CTC, while the model 
of WTC take-up among families eligible for WTC is presented in Table 10. Only the 
households who took part in all three rounds of interviews from 2002–03 to 2004–05 
were included in these analyses, so that information on prior receipt of the Working 
Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) was available. Prior receipt of WFTC was expected to be 
a particularly important predictor of WTC take-up, because the two tax credits had 
some common features and eligibility criteria.
22
The impact of tax credits on mothers’ employment
Table 9  Odds of take-up of CTC in 2004–05
 Odds ratio Robust SE
Dependent children
Age of youngest (ref. 5–10)
0–4 1.26* 0.15
11–15 1.21 0.13
16–19 0.48** 0.07
N children aged 0–4 (ref. 2)
1 1.04 0.11
3 or more 0.83 0.10
Mother
Worked in 2003–04 (if lone parent) 0.45* 0.15
Worked in 2003–04 (if couple) 0.98
Age in 2004–05 1.01 0.06
Age squared 1.00 0.00
Left education aged (ref. 16 or under)
17–18 0.99 0.10
19+ 0.66** 0.07
White 0.94 0.18
Has long-standing illness 1.24 0.14
Family
Couple (if did not work in 2003–04) 0.16** 0.05
Couple (if worked in 2003–04) 0.34
Own house (ref. rent) 0.71* 0.10
Received WFTC in 2002–03 1.80** 0.26
Equivalised weekly income (modifi ed OECD scale) 
   in 2003–04 (ref. £45.01–132)
£45 or less 0.80 0.16
£132.01–204 0.80 0.13
£204.01–282 0.82 0.13
£282.01 or more 0.32** 0.05
Region (ref. North)
Scotland 0.93 0.15
Centre 0.93 0.10
South 0.78* 0.09
London 0.45** 0.08
Wales 0.84 0.16
Couple*worked in 2003–04 2.17* 0.74
Pseudo R-square 0.17
Unweighted cases 4,583
Base: working-age women with dependent children eligible for CTC in 2004–05, who participated in all 
three rounds of interviews 2002–03 to 2004–05.
*  Signifi cant at 5 per cent; **  signifi cant at 1 per cent (null hypothesis: odds ratio = 1).
Longitudinal weights used.
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Table 10  Odds of take-up of WTC in 2004–05
 Odds ratio Robust SE
Dependent children
Age of youngest (ref. 5–10)
0–4 0.90 0.17
11–15 1.13 0.21
16–19 0.72 0.18
N children aged 0–4 (ref. 2)
1 0.98 0.17
3 or more 1.37 0.28
Mother
Worked in 2003–04 0.95 0.17
Age in 2004–05 1.00 0.07
Age squared 1.00 0.00
Left education aged (ref. 16 or under)
17–18 1.02 0.18
19+ 0.92 0.19
White 0.60 0.17
Has long-standing illness 1.07 0.20
Family
Couple 0.28** 0.05
Own house (ref. rent) 0.56** 0.09
Received WFTC in 2002–03 3.11** 0.48
Equivalised weekly income (modifi ed OECD scale) 
   in 2003–04 (ref. £40.01–79)
£40 or less 0.49** 0.12
£79.01–116 0.46** 0.11
£116.01–177 0.39** 0.09
£177.01 or more 0.22** 0.05
Region (ref. North)
Scotland 0.93 0.24
Centre 0.75 0.14
South 1.07 0.21
London 0.44** 0.14
Wales 1.41 0.46
Pseudo R-square 0.23
Unweighted cases 1,348
Base: working-age women with dependent children eligible for WTC in 2004–05, who participated in 
all three rounds of interviews 2002–03 to 2004–05.
**  Signifi cant at 1 per cent (null hypothesis: odds ratio = 1).
Longitudinal weights used.
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The ‘odds ratio’ columns in Tables 9 and 10 show the impact of each variable in 
the model on the likelihood of receiving CTC or WTC, respectively, relative to not 
receiving this tax credit, when all other variables in the model are held constant. For 
continuous variables, such as age of mother, an odds ratio greater than 1 indicates 
that the likelihood of receiving the tax credit increases (decreases) when the value 
of the continuous variable increases (decreases). For other (categorical) variables, 
however, an odds ratio greater than 1 shows the factor by which the odds of receiving 
the tax credit for cases in one category of the variable exceed the odds for those 
in the reference category. The ‘equivalised weekly income (modifi ed OECD scale) 
in 2003–04’ variable refers to household income from earnings and social security 
benefi ts but excludes any income from tax credits.
Families with the youngest child aged four or younger were 26 per cent more likely to 
be claiming CTC than families with the youngest child in the fi ve to ten age category 
(Table 9). Families with the youngest dependent child aged 16–19,2 however, were 
only half as likely to be receiving CTC as families with the youngest child aged fi ve to 
ten. Though specifi c reasons for not applying were not stated in the data, this fi nding 
may be due to the fact that families with children in full-time non-university education 
aged 16–19 are not aware of their eligibility for tax credits, or perhaps they just 
consider applying as too much hassle. The number of dependent children on its own 
did not have a signifi cant effect on the odds of CTC take-up.
Mother’s activity status at the previous round of interviews was a crucial predictor of 
take-up. Among lone-parent families, mothers who worked in 2003–04 were only 45 
per cent as likely to be claiming CTC in 2004–05 as mothers who were not employed 
at the time of the previous round of interviews. However, among mothers from couple 
families, previous work status had no signifi cant effect on current CTC receipt, when 
other important characteristics were controlled for. This may suggest that working 
lone parents are less aware of CTC or of their eligibility for it.
Mother’s education was negatively associated with CTC take-up. Those who left 
full-time education at the age of 19 or older were only 66 per cent as likely to be 
receiving CTC as those who left education at the age of 16 or younger, controlling 
for other characteristics in the model. Since better educated women may also have 
higher household incomes, this fi nding may be explained by their lower entitlement 
levels and fewer monetary incentives to claim the tax credits. However, since fi ve 
income categories were controlled for, this cannot be the full explanation. In the 
analysis of WFTC take-up, Adam and Brewer (2005) found that more educated lone 
parents were less likely to claim WFTC, while education had no signifi cant effect on 
couple families.
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Among families where the mother did not work in 2003–04, couple families were only 
16 per cent as likely to be claiming CTC in 2004–05 as lone parents. Among families 
where the mother was in paid work in 2003–04, couple families were 34 per cent as 
likely to be receiving CTC as lone parents. This supports the fi nding of the descriptive 
analysis that eligible lone parents are more likely to take up CTC than eligible couple 
families (Table 1 in Chapter 2). However, since entitlement levels were not controlled 
for in this analysis, as they could not be modelled precisely, this fi nding may be 
due to the fact that lone parents are more likely to be entitled to higher amounts. At 
the same time, families who owned their house were only 70 per cent as likely to 
be receiving CTC as those who were renting their accommodation. Families who 
were receiving WFTC in 2002–03 were almost twice as likely to be claiming CTC in 
2004–05. This is probably because WFTC recipients were sent CTC/WTC application 
forms.
Though all families in the analysis were found to be income eligible for at least 
some level of CTC, those in the highest income quintile (more than £285 a week, 
equivalised using modifi ed OECD scale) were only 32 per cent as likely to be 
claiming CTC as families in the second income quintile. This is not surprising, since 
these families must have been entitled to much lower levels of CTC and, so, had 
fewer fi nancial incentives to claim it. Important regional differences in the likelihood 
of CTC take-up emerged. Eligible families in the South of England were 78 per cent 
as likely to be receiving CTC as eligible families in the North, while those in London 
were only 45 per cent as likely to claim CTC as those in the North. Given high rates 
of child poverty in London, this is a worrying fi nding.
Among families eligible for WTC (and, hence, for CTC as well), couple families were 
only 28 per cent as likely to be claiming WTC as lone parents, when other important 
characteristics were controlled for. This supports the fi ndings of the descriptive 
analysis (Table 5 in Chapter 2) that eligible lone parents were more likely to be 
taking up WTC than women in eligible couple families. However, as mentioned 
above, it may be that lone parents are more likely to take up WTC because they are 
entitled to higher amounts than mothers in couple families. Families who owned their 
accommodation were 56 per cent as likely to be receiving WTC as those who were 
renting.
Prior receipt of WFTC was the most important predictor of WTC take-up. Families 
who claimed WFTC in 2002–03 were three times more likely to be receiving WTC 
in 2004–05, everything else held equal. This fi nding is as expected, since WFTC 
recipients were sent CTC/WTC application forms. Thus, those who used to receive 
WFTC would be more likely to apply for WTC.
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Signifi cant differences in the odds of take-up of WTC were found among eligible 
families from different income quintiles. Those in the second income quintile (£40.01–
79) were the most likely to take up WTC. Eligible families with weekly taxable 
household incomes, equivalised using the modifi ed OECD scale, of £40 or less and 
those in the third quintile (£79.01–116) were only half as likely to take up WTC as 
those in the second quintile. Unsurprisingly, families in the highest income quintile 
(£177.01 or more) were the least likely to be receiving WTC. Meanwhile, eligible 
families in London were only 44 per cent as likely to take up WTC as eligible families 
in the North of England.
Summary
n In 2004–05, eligible lone parents were substantially more likely to be receiving 
CTC and WTC (analysed separately for the CTC- and WTC-eligible samples) 
than mothers in couple families.
n Lone parents (but not mothers in couple families) eligible for CTC who had been 
in paid work in 2003–04 were about half as likely to take up CTC as those who 
had not been working in the previous round of interviews. Prior work status had 
no effect on the likelihood of WTC take-up among the eligible families; this is 
probably because they all satisfi ed the working hours requirement in 2004–05.
n CTC-eligible families who had been receiving WFTC in 2002–03 were almost 
twice as likely to take up CTC in 2004–05 as families who had not been claiming 
WFTC. WTC-eligible families were three times more likely to take up WTC if they 
had been claiming WFTC in 2002–03.
n CTC-eligible families with equivalised household incomes in the highest quintile 
were signifi cantly less likely to take up CTC than other families. There were 
important differences by income among WTC-eligible families. Those with 
incomes in the fi rst and the third quintiles were only about half as likely to take 
up WTC as those with incomes in the second quintile, those with incomes in the 
fourth quintile were about one-third as likely and those in the fi fth quintile were 
one-fi fth as likely to take up WTC as those with incomes in the second quintile.
n CTC-eligible families in the London area were about half as likely to be receiving 
CTC as those in the North of England and WTC-eligible families in the London 
area were about half as likely to take up WTC as those in the North.
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4 The impact of CTC on labour market 
participation of women with children
This chapter investigates the impact of the new tax credits on the labour market 
participation of women with children, with particular emphasis on the effect of 
CTC, even though it was not designed specifi cally to encourage labour market 
participation. Compared with the scenario of no fi nancial support for families with 
children, the likely effect of CTC on women’s employment is unambiguously negative. 
Since the benefi t is payable irrespective of work status, but is withdrawn as income 
increases, it may discourage women from entering the labour market or encourage 
those in paid employment to cut their hours. WTC, on the other hand, may provide a 
work incentive for fi rst earners in families, since, by defi nition, it can be received only 
by those in work. For second earners in families, however, WTC provides a negative 
work incentive. This chapter fi rst examines differences in the 2004–05 employment 
rates of CTC recipients and eligible non-recipients after they have been matched 
on a number of important individual and family characteristics. Second, to study the 
relationship between CTC receipt and employment, transitions from non-participation 
to employment and from employment to non-participation are analysed for those who 
were not in receipt of WTC.
Average impact of CTC on labour market participation of 
women with children: PSM analysis
To compare employment rates of eligible women with children from CTC-recipient 
households and those from non-recipient households, while ensuring that only 
suffi ciently similar individuals were compared, a matching technique (PSM) was used 
(see Appendix 3 for model specifi cation). Individual and household characteristics 
that were expected to affect the likelihood of CTC receipt, fi xed at their 2002–03 
values, were summarised in a single ‘propensity score’ (see Appendix 2, Table A2.1). 
Each CTC recipient in 2004–05 was then matched to one or more non-recipients 
with a similar propensity to be in a CTC-recipient household. The difference in 
average employment rates of CTC recipients and non-recipients in the matched 
sample was then estimated as the ‘average treatment on the treated’ (ATT). This is 
the average effect of receiving CTC on recipients and, since the majority of recipients 
of CTC had to actively claim it, this effect may be different for recipients than it would 
have been for eligible non-recipients had they decided to take up CTC.
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Because the effect of CTC was expected to differ between lone parents and mothers 
in couple families (with working and non-working partners), matching was performed 
separately for women with children who were lone parents and for those who were 
in couple families with working partners in the fourth round of FACS interviews 
(2002–03), before the new tax credits became operational. Women in couple families 
with non-working partners were excluded from the analysis because very low case 
numbers did not allow separate analysis of this sub-sample. In both the sample of 
lone parents and the sample of mothers with working partners the balancing property 
of the matching was satisfi ed. (For detailed PSM diagnostics, see Appendix 2, Table 
A2.2.)
Table 11 shows the average employment rates of mothers in 2004–05 for the whole 
CTC-eligible samples and for the matched samples of lone parents and mothers with 
working partners.
In 2004–05, CTC had a signifi cant negative effect on participation of women with 
children, though it was larger in magnitude for lone parents than for mothers in 
couple families. In the matched sample of lone parents, the average employment 
rate of CTC recipients was 11 percentage points lower than that of comparable 
non-recipients. However, this apparently negative effect of CTC on employment 
rates of lone parents may have been due to the fact that IS and JSA recipients, 
who were by defi nition out of work, were defi ned as CTC recipients, driving the 
average rate downwards. Yet, not all unemployed lone parents were receiving IS/JSA. 
This analysis still indicates that CTC recipients were, on balance, a lot less likely 
to be employed than eligible non-recipients with similar individual and household 
characteristics. This result is entirely in line with labour economics theory.
Table 11  Average employment rates of women with children in 2004–05
CTC receipt in 2004–05 Per cent
 Lone parents in 2002–03 Couple families in 2002–03
 All Matched sample All Matched sample
Receives CTC 57 57 77 77
Does not receive CTC 81 69 84 85
ATT –24 –11 * –7 –8 **
(SE)  (0.05)  (0.02)
N 1,313 1,250 3,057 3,053
Recipients 1,190 1,127 2,149 2,145
Non-recipients 123 123 908 908
Base: working-age women with dependent children eligible for CTC in 2004–05 who participated in 
both the 2002–03 and 2004–05 rounds of interviews.
*  Signifi cant at 5 per cent; **  signifi cant at 1 per cent.
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In the matched sample of mothers in couple families with working partners, CTC 
recipients had an eight percentage point lower participation rate than comparable 
non-recipients, on average. This difference was statistically signifi cant. Since mothers 
with working partners were not in receipt of IS or JSA, the negative effect of CTC 
cannot be attributed to these out-of-work benefi ts. Interestingly, the difference 
in employment rates between CTC recipients and eligible non-recipients in the 
unmatched sample was similar to the ATT effect in the matched sample.
While PSM analysis has referred to one point in time, the following section 
explores the effect of CTC on participation of women with children from a dynamic 
perspective.
Effect of CTC on moving into work: transitions analysis
Analysis that explored further the relationship between CTC receipt and employment, 
using changes in the observed variables over two years and controlling for 
unobserved individual differences that are assumed not to change from one round of 
interviews to the next, showed that CTC receipt on its own did not have a signifi cant 
effect on the likelihood of being in work in 2003–04 or 2004–05 (Appendix 2, Table 
A2.3). However, the estimated effect of CTC may have been partly due to the positive 
effect of WTC, which has not been controlled for, balancing out the negative effect 
of CTC. Thus we need to take into account the availability of WTC, which may have 
a positive work incentive effect. Indeed, Chapter 2 showed that a large proportion of 
CTC recipients also reported WTC receipt. Controlling for WTC receipt, however, is 
very diffi cult because it is conditioned on work of 16 or more hours a week and so all 
WTC recipients are by defi nition in paid employment.
One way to gauge the effect of CTC on employment separately from that of WTC is 
to look at moving into work only for those who were not receiving WTC in 2003–04 
or 2004–05. However, since this analysis uses a non-random sub-sample, the 
results cannot be generalised to the whole population of women with children. 
For women not employed at the time of the 2002–03 interview, before the new tax 
credits became operational, a transition to work could have occurred in the period 
between the 2002–03 and 2003–04 interviews or in the subsequent year (the period 
between 2003–04 and 2004–05 interviews). However, because of the lack of monthly 
information on tax credit receipt, it is impossible to establish the sequence of the two 
events of interest (starting receiving CTC and moving into work). Therefore, nothing 
can be said with certainty about causality in the relationship between CTC receipt 
and employment.
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Table 12 presents the results of a discrete-time event history model of moving into 
work (see Appendix 3 for model specifi cation). Variable ‘year’ takes on the value of 1 
referring to the period 2003–04 to 2004–05 and the value of 0 for the period 2002–03 
to 2003–04. The variable ‘CTC’ indicates receipt of CTC, with non-recipients in the 
reference group. The variables ‘CTC*year’ and ‘couple*CTC’ refer to the interaction 
effects between CTC receipt and the period of observation, and family type and CTC 
receipt, respectively.
CTC had a signifi cant negative effect on the odds of moving into work for women with 
children who were not employed at the 2002–03 round of interviews, did not report 
WTC receipt at the 2003–04 or 2004–05 interview and were identifi ed as eligible 
for CTC in 2004–05. This effect varied by year and partnership status. Among lone 
parents who were out of work at the 2002–03 interview, those who started receiving 
CTC by the time of the next interview were only 8 per cent as likely to move into work 
in this period as those who did not start receiving CTC. Lone parents who started 
receiving CTC in the period between the 2003–04 and 2004–05 interviews were 
only 17 per cent as likely to move into work as those who did not claim CTC. Among 
women in couple families, CTC recipients were 42 per cent as likely to start working 
in the period 2002–03 to 2003–04 and 87 per cent as likely to move into work in the 
period 2003–04 to 2004–05 as non-recipients, everything else being equal. Among 
CTC recipients, women in couple families were 3.6 times more likely to move into 
work in any period than lone parents, while there was no signifi cant difference by 
partnership status among CTC non-recipients. Everything else held equal, older 
mothers were more likely to move into work in either of the studied periods.
It may be a cause for concern that CTC recipients, who were not in receipt of WTC 
at any interview, were substantially less likely than non-recipients to move into work, 
after various important personal and family characteristics were controlled for. The 
negative effect of CTC was signifi cantly larger in magnitude for lone parents than for 
mothers in couple families.
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Table 12  Effect of CTC on moving into work for those not in receipt of WTC
Predictor Odds ratio Robust SE
Time varying
Year: 2003–04 to 2004–05 (ref. 2002–03 to 2003–04) 0.38** 0.11
CTC if lone parent, 2002–03 to 2003–04 0.08** 0.04
CTC if lone parent, 2003–04 to 2004–05 0.17
CTC if couple, 2002–03 to 2003–04 0.42
CTC if couple, 2003–04 to 2004–05 0.87
CTC*year 2.06* 0.73
Couple if no CTC 0.68 0.33
Couple if CTC 3.58
Couple*CTC 5.27** 2.77
Age of youngest child 1.04 0.03
N children aged 0–4 (ref. 2)
1 1.13 0.22
3 or more 0.67 0.14
Own house (rent) 1.23 0.29
Has long-standing illness 0.82 0.17
Time invariant
Age 1.24** 0.09
Age squared 1.00** 0.00
Left education aged (ref. 16 or under)
17–18 1.15 0.22
19+ 0.88 0.20
White 1.06 0.33
Received WFTC in 2002–03 1.61 0.48
Weekly equivalised income in 2002–03 (£276.01 or over)
£43 or under 0.95 0.32
£43.01–130 1.09 0.40
£130.01–203 1.45 0.43
£203.01–276 1.65 0.53
Pseudo R-square 0.13
Wald chi-square 165.42 **
Observations 1,705
Base: working-age women with dependent children, eligible for CTC in 2004–05, who participated in 
three rounds of interviews 2002–03 to 2004–05, were not employed at 2002–03 interview and did not 
receive WTC at either 2003–04 or 2004–05 interviews.
*  Signifi cant at 5 per cent; **  signifi cant at 1 per cent (null hypothesis: odds ratio = 1).
Longitudinal weight used.
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Effect of CTC on moving out of work: transitions analysis
Since CTC had a negative infl uence on the probability of moving into work for those 
who had not been working at the time of the interview prior to the introduction of the 
new tax credits, it is of interest to explore the effect of CTC on moving out of work for 
those who had been employed at the 2002–03 interview. Only those who were not in 
receipt of WTC in any of the studied periods were included in the analysis. Table 13 
presents the results of a discrete-time event history model of moving out of work.
Among lone parents who were in work at the time of the 2002–03 interview, those 
who started receiving CTC in the period 2003–04 to 2004–05 were almost three 
times more likely to move out of work during this time than CTC non-recipients, 
everything else being equal. Women in couple families, on the other hand, were 
about half as likely to move out of work in the period 2002–03 to 2003–04 if they 
were receiving CTC as those who were not receiving CTC. Among CTC recipients, 
partnered mothers were only 26 per cent as likely to become unemployed as 
lone parents. There was no signifi cant difference by family type among CTC non-
recipients. Thus, CTC had a positive effect on the probability of moving out of work 
for lone parents, who were employed prior to the introduction of the new tax credits, 
but a negative effect for mothers in couple families.
Mothers with older children were less likely to move out of work, everything else 
being equal, and so were older women. Mothers from families in the lowest income 
quintile (2002–03 household income equivalised using modifi ed OECD scale) were 
more than twice as likely to move out of work in any of the two studied periods as 
women from the highest income quintile. Women from the London area were more 
than twice as likely to move out of work as those in the North, everything else being 
equal.
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Table 13  Effect of CTC on moving out of work for those not in receipt of WTC
Predictor Odds ratio Robust SE
Time varying
Year: 2003–04 to 2004–05 (ref. 2002–03 to 2003–04) 0.54* 0.15
CTC if lone parent, 2002–03 to 2003–04 1.29 0.66
CTC if lone parent, 2003–04 to 2004–05 2.93
CTC if couple, 2002–03 to 2003–04 0.46
CTC if couple, 2003–04 to 2004–05 1.05
CTC*year 2.27* 0.77
Couple if no CTC 0.73 0.35
Couple if CTC 0.26
Couple*CTC 0.36* 0.18
Age of youngest child 0.86** 0.02
N children aged 0–4 (ref. 2)
1 0.74 0.13
3 or more 1.31 0.28
Own house (rent) 0.44** 0.08
Has long-standing illness 1.36 0.28
Time invariant
Age 0.76** 0.06
Age squared 1.00** 0.00
Left education aged (ref. 16 or under)
17–18 0.75 0.14
19+ 0.81 0.17
White 1.48 0.59
Received WFTC in 2002–03 0.97 0.21
Weekly equivalised income in 2002–03 (£276.01 or over)
£43 or under 2.58** 0.88
£43.01–130 1.25 0.33
£130.01–203 1.11 0.26
£203.01–276 0.93 0.20
Region (ref. North)
Scotland 1.42 0.40
Centre 1.46 0.30
South 1.50 0.33
London 2.18** 0.65
Wales 0.86 0.34
Pseudo R-square 0.15
Wald chi-square 253.03 **
Observations 3,852
Base: working-age women with dependent children, eligible for CTC in 2004–05, who participated 
in three rounds of interviews 2002–03 to 2004–05, were employed at 2002–03 interview and did not 
receive WTC at either 2003–04 or 2004–05 interviews.
*  Signifi cant at 5 per cent; **  signifi cant at 1 per cent (null hypothesis: odds ratio = 1).
Longitudinal weights used.
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Summary
n In 2004–05, estimated employment rates of lone parents who were receiving CTC 
were around 11 percentage points lower than the employment rates of eligible 
non-recipients with similar propensities of receiving CTC, based on various 
important background characteristics. Mothers in couple families who were in 
receipt of CTC had an eight percentage point lower employment rate, on average, 
than comparable non-recipients.
n From a dynamic perspective, after unobserved individual differences were 
accounted for but WTC receipt was not taken into account, CTC had no 
signifi cant effect on the likelihood of being in work in either 2003–04 or 2004–05. 
This may have been due to the positive effect of WTC, which was not controlled 
for, balancing out the negative effect of CTC.
n For those who had not been working at the 2002–03 round of interviews and were 
not in receipt of WTC at any of the two subsequent interviews, receiving CTC was 
associated with reduced chances of moving into paid work. The negative effect 
of CTC on the likelihood of moving into work was larger in magnitude for lone 
parents.
n For those who had been employed at the time of the 2002–03 interview and 
were not in receipt of WTC at any of the two subsequent interviews, CTC had 
a positive effect on the probability of moving out of work for lone parents, but a 
negative effect for mothers in couple families. Among CTC recipients, partnered 
mothers were substantially less likely to move out of work than lone parents, but 
there was no difference among CTC non-recipients.
n While there were no regional differences in the probability of moving into work, 
there were differences in the moving out of work analysis. Women in the London 
area were more than twice as likely to become unemployed as those in the North 
of England.
n This chapter has used a number of different analytical techniques, which were 
regarded as complementary, since each of them had limitations. PSM has 
demonstrated the differences in employment rates of otherwise comparable 
CTC recipients and non-recipients, but it could not capture the indirect effect of 
WTC awareness on employment. To isolate the effect of CTC on the likelihood 
of moving into work for those who were unemployed prior to the introduction of 
the tax credits and who were not in receipt of WTC in any of the two years after 
its introduction, a discrete-time event history approach (transitions analysis) was 
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appropriate. However, none of the employed methods could gauge the effect of 
WTC on participation, since those who receive WTC are, by defi nition, in work. 
Moreover, because only two years of data subsequent to the introduction of 
the tax credits were available and because there was no information about the 
sequence of events within each yearly period, these results have to be interpreted 
with caution.
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5 The impact of WTC and CTC on 
working hours of women with 
children
This chapter investigates the impact of WTC and CTC on hours of work of women 
with children. First, differences in working hours of WTC recipients and eligible non-
recipients in 2004–05 are examined after they have been matched on a number of 
important individual and family characteristics. Second, the effects of WTC and CTC 
are estimated using changes in various personal and family characteristics between 
2003–04 and 2004–05. Third, transitions from part-time to full-time work and vice 
versa are described.
Average effect of WTC on working hours of women with 
children: PSM analysis
A matching technique (PSM) was used to evaluate the effect of WTC on hours of 
work for women with children who were identifi ed as eligible for WTC in 2004–05 
(see Appendix 3 for model specifi cation). This analysis was similar to that described 
in the previous chapter for labour market participation and the background 
characteristics used in the estimation of the propensity scores are described in Table 
A2.4 in Appendix 2. Each WTC recipient in 2004–05 was matched to one or more 
non-recipients based on their propensity to be in a WTC-recipient household. The 
difference in average weekly working hours of WTC recipients and non-recipients in 
the matched sample was then estimated as ‘the average treatment on the treated’ 
(ATT).1 This is the average effect of receiving WTC on recipients and, since recipients 
of WTC had to actively claim it, this effect may be different for recipients than it would 
have been for eligible non-recipients had they decided to take up WTC.
Since the effect of CTC was expected to differ between lone parents and mothers in 
couple families (with working and non-working partners), matching was performed 
separately for women with children who were lone parents and for those who were in 
couple families with working partners in the fourth round of FACS interviews (2002–
03). Women in couple families with non-working partners were excluded from the 
analysis because very low case numbers did not allow separate analysis of this sub-
group. In both the sample of lone parents and the sample of mothers with working 
partners the balancing property of the matching was satisfi ed. (For detailed PSM 
diagnostics, see Appendix 2, Table A2.5.)
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Table 14 shows the average working hours of mothers in 2004–05 for the whole 
WTC-eligible sample and for the matched sample of women with children who were 
lone parents and those who were in couple families with working partners in 2002–
03.
WTC had a signifi cant negative impact on the working hours of both lone parents 
and mothers in couple families. In the matched sample of eligible lone parents, WTC 
recipients worked four hours less, on average, than comparable non-recipients. 
Estimating the effect of WTC on working hours using linear regression techniques, 
controlling for characteristics used in the propensity score estimation, produced a 
similar result with respect to the average effect of WTC to that obtained with PSM 
(Appendix 2, Table A2.6).
Mothers in couple families who were receiving WTC worked almost two-and-a-half 
hours less, on average, than comparable non-recipients in the matched sample, but 
this difference was not statistically signifi cant. Again, linear regression produced 
a similar result, with WTC having no signifi cant effect on working hours (Appendix 
2, Table A2.6). These results suggest that, for the problem at hand, PSM offers no 
apparent advantage over ordinary least squares regression.
Table 14  Working hours of women with children in 2004–05
WTC receipt in 2004–05 Mean hours of work
 Lone parents in 2002–03 Couple families in 2002–03
  Matched   Matched 
 All sample All sample
Receives WTC 26.5 26.7 26.6 26.6
Does not receive WTC 32.7 30.8 28.2 29.0
ATT –6.2 –4.1 ** –1.6 –2.4
(SE)  (1.44)  (1.43)
N 554 498 353 334
Recipients 443 387 151 132
Non-recipients 111 111 202 202
Base: working-age women with dependent children eligible for WTC in 2004–05 who participated in 
both the 2002–03 and 2004–05 rounds of interviews, and worked 16 or more hours a week in 2004–
05.
**  Signifi cant at 1 per cent.
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Effect of WTC and CTC on working hours of women with 
children: dynamic analysis
The previous section focused on the effect of WTC on working hours at a point 
in time. Since all WTC recipients were also receiving CTC, the gauged effect of 
WTC may have represented the combined effect of CTC and WTC. However, CTC 
might have an independent effect on hours worked, since it was usually received 
separately from WTC, which was paid through the wage packet to workers. Even 
though, from November 2005, WTC paid directly from HMRC began to be phased in, 
during the period this study covers WTC was still paid through the wage packet.
As described in the previous chapter, PSM cannot control for unobserved individual 
differences. Not accounting for them may bias the results if unobserved individual 
differences affect labour market behaviour and are correlated with other variables in 
the model (such as receipt of tax credits). The fact that FACS is a panel dataset that 
collects information about the same individuals over time helps us overcome this 
problem, if we assume that these unobserved differences do not change from one 
round of interviews to the next. In other words, we can compare the behaviour of the 
same women over two yeas after the introduction of CTC and WTC, assuming that 
things about them that might affect their labour market behaviour and the propensity 
to take up the tax credits, but which we don’t know about, will not have changed.
Table 15 presents the results of a fi xed-effects linear regression of working hours and 
various background characteristics that may change from one interview to the next 
(for ‘Hausman test’ specifi cation see Appendix 2, Table A2.7; for model specifi cation 
see Appendix 3).2 Only the individuals who participated in both the 2003–04 and 
2004–05 rounds of interviews, worked more than 15 hours a week at the time of 
each interview and were income eligible for WTC in 2004–05 were included in the 
analysis. The effects of all variables in the model were assumed not to change over 
time. Variable ‘year 2004–05’ takes on the value of 1 for 2004–05 and the value of 0 
for 2003–04, indicating the year-specifi c effects. Interaction terms between ‘year’ and 
CTC, ‘year’ and WTC, CTC and family type, and WTC and family type were tested but 
were not found to be statistically signifi cant. These interaction effects were omitted 
from the fi nal model.
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Unlike in the PSM analysis, WTC had no signifi cant effect on working hours in 
excess of 15 hours a week for women with children eligible for WTC in 2004–05.3 
CTC had no signifi cant effect on working hours either. There were signifi cant 
unobserved individual-specifi c effects, with 0.12 correlation between them and the 
observed characteristics in the model; a high proportion of variation in the data was 
due to the unobserved individual-specifi c effects – see Appendix 3, section on ‘Linear 
panel regression (fi xed effects)’. These results suggest that, among women with 
children eligible for WTC in 2004–05 and working 16 or more hours a week in both 
years of observation, the tax credits did not infl uence the change in working hours, 
once unobserved individual differences that are stable from one round of interviews 
to the next were accounted for. However, these fi ndings have to be interpreted with 
caution because of the relatively small numbers of cases analysed.
Table 15  Effect of WTC and CTC on working hours of women with children
Predictor B SE
Year: 2004–05 (ref. 2003–04) 0.78** 0.25
WTC 0.26 0.54
CTC –0.95 0.76
Couple (ref. lone parent) 0.49 0.87
Age of the youngest child (ref. 5-10)
0–4 –0.14 0.83
11–15 –1.05 1.01
16–19 –0.49 1.45
Number of children (ref. 2)
1 1.08 0.90
3 or more –0.70 1.36
Mother has a long-standing illness –0.06 .66
Constant 27.62** 1.01
Fraction of variance due to ui 0.79
Corr. (ui Xb) –0.12
F test that all ui = 0 6.83 **
Observations 1,768
Persons 884
Base: working-age women with dependent children, eligible for WTC in 2004–05, who participated in 
two rounds of interviews 2003–04 to 2004–05 and worked 16 or more hours at each interview.
ui  Unobserved individual factor.
**  Signifi cant at 1 per cent (null hypothesis: B = 0).
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Effect of WTC and CTC on moving from full-time to part-time 
work: transitions analysis
The previous section has suggested that WTC and CTC recipients worked similar 
hours each week on average to those eligible for, but not receiving, WTC or CTC. 
However, it is possible that tax credits might encourage women to move from working 
full-time (30 hours or more a week) to working part-time (16–29 hours a week). Since 
FACS is a panel survey, it is possible to investigate this by estimating the relative 
probabilities of making a transition from full-time to part-time work for women with 
children who worked full-time in 2002–03 and were eligible for WTC and CTC in 
2004–05. In order to ensure that the analysis included only women who may have 
been eligible for WTC in 2003–04 as well, we included only those who worked 16 or 
more hours a week in 2003–04 and 2004–05. Overall, only 7 per cent of those who 
were working 30 or more hours a week in 2002–03 had reduced their hours to 16–29 
a week in each of the following two years.
To control for the receipt of tax credits and other relevant characteristics, a 
‘discrete-time’ logistic regression model was estimated (see Appendix 3 for model 
specifi cation). Once a transition to part-time employment occurred, the individual was 
not followed up, so that only fi rst transitions were modelled.4 A transition could occur 
in one of the two periods – 2002–03 to 2003–04 or 2003–04 to 2004–05. The effects 
of all variables were assumed to be constant during the studied period. The effects 
of CTC and WTC did not change signifi cantly across the two studied periods, so the 
interaction terms between CTC (WTC) and year were omitted from the fi nal model. 
Table 16 presents the results of the logistic regression analysis.
For women with children eligible for WTC (and CTC) in 2004–05, neither WTC 
nor CTC had a signifi cant effect on the probability of moving from full-time work in 
2002–03 to part-time work in any of the two subsequent years, when other important 
individual and household characteristics were controlled for. However, these fi ndings 
have to be interpreted with caution because of the relatively small numbers of cases 
analysed.
At the same time, 14 per cent of those who worked part-time in 2002–03 moved 
into full-time work in one of the two subsequent years. Once the background 
characteristics were controlled for, there were no signifi cant differences by WTC or 
CTC receipt in the likelihood of making a transition into full-time work. The results of 
the logistic regression model are presented in Appendix 2 (Table A2.8).
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Table 16  Odds of moving from full-time to part-time work for those working 16 or 
more hours a week
Predictor Odds ratio Robust SE
Time varying
Year: 2004–05 (ref. 2003–04) 0.48* 0.16
WTC 1.25 0.52
CTC 1.48 0.99
Couple (ref. lone parent) 1.17 0.49
Age of the youngest child 0.96 0.04
Number of children (ref. 2)
1 0.70 0.24
3 or more 0.25 0.20
Mother has a long-standing illness 1.51 0.56
Own house (ref. rent) 0.72 0.27
Time invariant
Mother’s age in 2002–03 0.96 0.03
Left education aged (ref. 16 or under)
17–18 1.14 0.43
19+ 1.47 0.72
White 6.84 7.28
Received WFTC in 2002–03 0.42 0.17
Equivalised weekly income (modifi ed OECD scale) 
   in 2002–03 (ref. £188.01 or over)
£35 or under 4.40* 3.19
£35.01–83 1.33 1.00
£83.01–120 2.02 1.10
£120.01–188 2.78 1.38
Region (ref. North)
Scotland 0.53 0.32
Centre 0.54 0.24
South 0.92 0.46
London 3.22 2.28
Wales 1.81 1.04
Wald chi-square 37.52 *
Observations 470
Base: working-age women with dependent children, who were eligible for WTC in 2004–05, 
participated in three rounds of interviews 2002–03 to 2004–05 and worked 16 or more hours at each 
interview.
*  Signifi cant at 5 per cent (null hypothesis: odds ratio = 1).
Longitudinal weights used.
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Summary
n In 2004–05, lone parents who were receiving WTC worked around four hours 
less, on average, than eligible non-recipients with a similar propensity of receiving 
WTC, based on various important background characteristics. Women in couple 
families (with employed partners) who received WTC worked a similar number of 
hours, on average, to comparable non-recipients.
n However, when changes in working hours over time were examined, after 
unobserved individual differences were accounted for, neither WTC nor CTC had 
a signifi cant effect on working hours of women with children working 16 or more 
hours a week in 2003–04 and 2004–05, and eligible for WTC (and CTC) in 2004–
05.
n For women with children eligible for WTC (and CTC) in 2004–05, neither WTC not 
CTC had a signifi cant effect on the probability of moving from full-time work (30 or 
more hours a week) in 2002–03 to part-time work (between 16 and 29 hours) in 
any of the two subsequent years, when other important individual and household 
characteristics were controlled for. Similarly, neither of the tax credits increased 
the chances of moving from part-time to full-time work among those who worked 
16–29 hours a week in 2002–03.
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This report had two main objectives:
1 to analyse the impact of the new tax credits (Child Tax Credit and Working Tax 
Credit) on labour market participation and working hours of women with children
2 to explore reasons for non-take-up of these tax credits.
The context for the research is the Government’s aim to halve child poverty by 2010 
and to abolish it by 2020. However, the Government has failed to lift a quarter of 
children out of poverty by 2005. Recent research has shown that these ambitious 
aims will not be met unless further progress is made in encouraging women with 
children, both lone parents and those with partners, into the labour market, and will 
also require high take-up rates of WTC and CTC, which were introduced in April 
2003. To date there has been little research on either of these areas.
The study has used data from the three latest available rounds of interviews of the 
longitudinal Families and Children Study (FACS), 2002–05. Since 2001, FACS has 
produced a representative sample of all families with dependent children in Britain 
and provides a wealth of information on the contemporary situation of families with 
children, including employment, income and benefi ts data. The main respondents 
in households are usually women, but, where the main respondent was male, the 
information about his female partner was used for this study. Thus, the family-level 
dataset has been restricted to working-age women with one or more dependent 
children in the family, who were not in full-time education and not receiving Incapacity 
Benefi t or Disability Living Allowance. The analysis included only the families who 
were identifi ed as eligible for CTC based on their family structure and income. A sub-
set of these families were identifi ed as eligible for WTC based on their working hours 
and income.
One complication for the research is that the two tax credits, while sharing the 
underlying aim of reducing child poverty, are likely to work in different, and possibly 
confl icting, directions. CTC, on the one hand, can be seen as aimed directly at 
reducing child poverty by providing a seamless system of income-tested fi nancial 
support for children, paid to the main carer of the child(ren), irrespective of whether 
the parent(s) are in work or not. CTC was therefore expected to have a negative 
effect on women’s labour market participation if women chose to remain out of work, 
to reduce their hours of work, or even to leave work. However, actual experiences 
of CTC receipt may not have been as hassle free as intended, as the evidence of 
various problems with the administration of the tax credits in the early years of their 
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operation indicates. On the other hand, WTC was expected to work indirectly on child 
poverty by acting as an incentive to parents to enter the labour market, since the 
benefi t is available only to those in employment working 16 hours a week or more.
Another policy-related complication that had implications for our research needs 
to be mentioned here. Those who were out of work and receiving Income Support 
(IS) or Job Seeker’s Allowance (JSA) in April 2003 when the new tax credits were 
introduced continued to receive allowances for their children as part of their benefi t 
payments from Job Centre Plus. They would be unaware that their benefi t was now 
made up of the CTC and adult elements of IS or JSA. The original intention was that 
these families would be migrated to the CTC by April 2004 and would then receive 
their payments separately. However, this has still not happened and will not start in 
2007. The implications for the work-incentive effects of the tax credits are unclear 
and posed challenges for this research. On the one hand, mothers in receipt of IS 
or JSA before April 2003, mainly lone parents, would not be aware that they were 
receiving CTC. This could lead to the conclusion that such women should have been 
excluded from our analysis. However, this would have led to a massive overstatement 
of the work-incentive effect of both CTC and WTC, since the remaining sample 
would have consisted largely of those who were already employed at the time the tax 
credits were introduced. Furthermore, although these mothers were not receiving a 
sum of money labelled as CTC, they were benefi ting from the increases in payments 
for children that CTC has provided. It was decided therefore to include this group 
of mothers in our research, which is consistent with the approach used by HMRC 
in estimating take-up rates (HRMC, 2006, 2007). Further analysis will need to be 
undertaken once this issue has been resolved and/or once there are more mothers 
who have only been in receipt of IS/JSA since the new tax credits were introduced 
and who will have received separate payments from the start of their claims.
Despite these reservations, the research has produced some interesting fi ndings 
in relation to take-up, labour market participation and working hours, which are 
summarised here along with some of the policy implications.
Take-up of CTC and WTC
Our best estimate of take up in 2004–05 suggests that, among families eligible for 
CTC, lone parents were much more likely to be in receipt of CTC than mothers in 
couple families. Among families eligible for WTC, lone parents were also more likely 
to take it up. Given that receipt of WTC was measured at the household level and 
income was controlled for, this suggests that further work to improve take-up among 
couple families with children could prove fruitful.
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The mother’s activity status at the previous round of interviews was an important 
predictor of take-up of the new tax credits. Lone parents (but not mothers in couple 
families) eligible for CTC who had been in paid work in 2003–04 were about half as 
likely to take up CTC as those who had not been working in the previous round of 
interviews. Prior work status had no effect on the likelihood of WTC take-up among 
the eligible families, however, prior receipt of WFTC was another crucial predictor 
of take-up. CTC-eligible families who had been receiving WFTC in 2002–03 were 
almost twice as likely to take up CTC in 2004–05 as families who had not been 
claiming WFTC, while WTC-eligible families were three times more likely to take up 
WTC if they had been claiming WFTC in 2002–03. This fi nding is as expected, since 
WFTC recipients were sent CTC/WTC application forms and so were more likely to 
apply for the new tax credits.
CTC-eligible families with previous year’s equivalised household incomes in the 
highest quintile were signifi cantly less likely to take up CTC than other families, as 
expected. There were important differences by income among WTC-eligible families. 
Those with incomes in the fi rst and the third quintiles were only about half as likely 
to take up WTC as those with incomes in the second quintile, those with incomes in 
the fourth quintile were about one-third as likely and those in the fi fth quintile were 
one-fi fth as likely to take up WTC as those with incomes in the second quintile. It is a 
cause for concern that WTC-eligible families in the lowest income quintile were only 
half as likely to take up WTC as those in the second quintile.
A particularly worrying fi nding was that families in the London area were the least 
likely to be receiving CTC and WTC in 2004–05: CTC-eligible families were about 
half as likely to be receiving CTC as those in the North of England and WTC-eligible 
families were about half as likely to be receiving WTC as eligible families in the North. 
Child poverty rates are high in London, 39 per cent in 2004–05 on the After Housing 
Cost measure of relative income poverty, compared with the national poverty rate of 
27 per cent. Action to improve take-up in London is urgently needed.
The impact of CTC on labour market participation of women 
with children
In 2004–05, estimated employment rates of lone parents who were receiving CTC 
were around 11 percentage points lower than the employment rates of eligible non-
recipients with similar propensities of receiving CTC, based on various important 
background characteristics. Mothers in couple families who were in receipt of CTC 
had an eight percentage point lower employment rate, on average, than comparable 
non-recipients.
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For those who had not been working at the 2002–03 round of interviews and were 
not in receipt of WTC at any of the two subsequent interviews, CTC had a negative 
effect on the probability of moving into work during the next two years. The negative 
effect of CTC was larger in magnitude for lone parents. At the same time, CTC had 
a positive effect on the probability of moving out of work for lone parents who had 
been working at the time of the 2002–03 interview and were not receiving WTC at 
any of the next two interviews, but a negative effect for mothers in couple families. 
Among CTC recipients, partnered mothers were substantially less likely to move out 
of work than lone parents, but there was no difference by family type among CTC 
non-recipients. Women in the London area were more than twice as likely to become 
unemployed as those in the North of England.
An important omission from the study was that we were not able to look at the impact 
of WTC on labour market participation of women with children, which should be 
positive for lone parents and negative for second earners in couples.
The impact of WTC and CTC on working hours of women with 
children
In 2004–05, lone parents who were receiving WTC worked around four hours less 
than eligible non-recipients with a similar propensity of receiving WTC. Women 
in couple families (with employed partners) who received WTC worked a similar 
number of hours, on average, to comparable non-recipients. However, when changes 
in working hours over time were examined, after unobserved individual differences 
were accounted for, neither WTC nor CTC had a signifi cant effect on working hours 
of women with children working 16 or more hours a week in 2003–04 and 2004–05, 
and eligible for WTC (and CTC) in 2004–05.
For women with children eligible for WTC (and CTC) in 2004–05, neither WTC nor 
CTC had a signifi cant effect on the probability of moving from full-time work (30 or 
more hours a week) in 2002–03 to part-time work (between 16 and 29 hours) in 
any of the two subsequent years, when other important individual and household 
characteristics were controlled for. Similarly, neither of the tax credits increased the 
chances of moving from part-time to full-time work among those who worked 16–29 
hours a week in 2002–03.
In the context of the fi nding that CTC had a negative effect on participation of women 
with children, especially of lone parents, it may seem surprising that the tax credits 
had little effect on working hours. However, only those who were working 16 or 
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more hours a week before and after the tax credits were introduced were examined 
in the working hours analysis. Thus, CTC did a relatively poor job of pushing non-
participating mothers into work, but, for those who were already working and eligible 
for WTC, the tax credits did not produce substantial changes in hours of work. It may 
also be the case that employees cannot easily adjust their working hours within a 
short period of time.
Conclusion
For policymakers, the report contains both encouraging and discouraging fi ndings. 
On take-up, further work is needed to encourage couple families to take up the tax 
credits and, particularly, families in London. CTC appears to have a work-disincentive 
effect for those who were not receiving WTC, especially for lone mothers, suggesting 
that, for those who wish to work under 16 hours a week, CTC is a fi nancial 
disincentive to enter the labour market. However, neither CTC nor WTC appears to 
have resulted in mothers reducing their working hours if they already worked 16 or 
more hours a week.
This research was undertaken using data from the longitudinal Families and Children 
Study (FACS) for 2002–03 (before the new tax credits were introduced), 2003–04 
and 2004–05. Therefore we had access to data only for the fi rst two years after the 
tax credits were introduced. Once further data become available it is likely that more 
robust conclusions will be possible. For the technically minded, the report has shown 
the importance of selecting the most appropriate statistical method for modelling the 
impact of the new tax credits and the value of longitudinal data in so doing.
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Chapter 1
1 Directgov – Child Tax Credit Factsheet (available at http://www.direct.gov.uk/
Bfsl1/Benefi tsAndFinancialSupport/Benefi tsAndFinancialSupportArticles/fs/
en?CONTENT_ID=10018929&chk=UPfIRv).
2 ‘Whilst the same people are followed at each wave, new people are also added to 
refresh the sample each year’ (FACS 2004 User Guide, NatCen).
3 Information is also available about receipt of the childcare element but the 
numbers in receipt were very small, so this has not been included in the analysis.
4 Due to illness or disability, individuals receiving Incapacity Benefi t or Disability 
Living Allowance are usually not in work (6.9 per cent of all interviewed in Wave 
6). To focus on women with children, households headed by lone fathers were 
also removed (1.4 per cent of all interviewed in Wave 6).
5 In the statement on 6 December 2006, the Paymaster General said that ‘the 
Government will not begin migration of the remaining IS/JSA recipients with 
children to the child tax credit in 2007’.
6 There was no valid information on the nature of JSA receipt (contributory or non-
contributory) or its duration, but the number of JSA claimants was too low for this 
lack of information to bias the results.
7 Panel data are repeated observations on the same cross-section observed for 
several time periods (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).
8 A consistent estimator is that which converges in probability to the true value of 
the parameter being estimated as the sample size grows to infi nity (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2005, p. 945).
9 For detailed discussion on panel data models see Greene (1993); Wooldridge, 
(2002); Cameron and Trivedi (2005).
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Chapter 2
1 The data for 2004–05 were weighted by Wave 6 cross-sectional weights provided 
with the FACS dataset.
2 Similar analysis was not carried out using the 2003–04 rounds of interviews of 
FACS because information on costs of childcare was not available.
3 Since those who received Incapacity Benefi t during the 2004–05 round of 
interviews were removed from the sample, only 0.5 per cent of those interviewed 
in 2004–05 reported receiving Incapacity Benefi t in 2003–04.
4 Or below the level at which both WTC and CTC (apart from the ‘family element’) 
are tapered away entirely, if this level of income exceeds £50,000 a year.
5 Two per cent of CTC-eligible families who reported receiving WTC only were 
reclassifi ed into receiving both CTC and WTC because it is impossible for a family 
with dependent children to receive WTC only.
Chapter 3
1 Because entitlement may be endogenous to some of the observed characteristics 
in the take-up model, it would also be appropriate to use the Instrumental 
Variables approach to account for this.
2 The vast majority of families with the youngest dependent child aged 16–19 had 
children aged 16–17. Children aged 16–19 were defi ned as dependent for benefi t 
purposes only if they were in full-time non-university education.
Chapter 5
1 Only those in the common support region were used in the estimation of ATT. 
Kernel-based matching with Epanechnikov kernel and the bandwidth of 0.01 was 
employed, using the PSMATCH2 procedure in Stata (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003). 
The results were consistent when other matching estimators were used.
2 Unobserved heterogeneity was also statistically signifi cant in the random effects 
model. However, there was a statistically signifi cant difference between random 
effects and the fi xed effects estimates, according to the Hausman (1978) test, so 
the consistent fi xed-effects estimator was more appropriate.
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3 Working hours were also estimated using Heckman’s selection model, since 
those who were not in work or worked under 16 hours a week were omitted from 
the original model, but the selection effect was not statistically signifi cant.
4 Thus, it is possible that some of the transitions to part-time work were only 
temporary, but we would need more years of data to model second transitions.
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Appendix 1: Defi ning eligibility for CTC 
and WTC for 2004–05
Maximum CTC award*
n Family element: £545.
n Baby addition (‘new birth to respondent since last wave’): £545.
n Child element × number of dependent children N: £1,625 × N.
n Disabled child element (‘receiving DLA [Disability Living Allowance] for 
children’): £2,215.
Maximum WTC award**
n Basic element: £1,570.
n Couple/lone parent element: £1,545.
n Thirty-hour element***: £640.
n Childcare element:
– one child in formal**** term-time care costing £135 per week or more: 
£4,914 (0.70 × 52 × 135)
– one child in care costing less than £135 per week: 0.70 × 52 × cost
– two or more children in care costing £200 per week or more: £7,280 (0.70 
× 52 × 200)
– two or more children in care costing less than £200 per week: 0.70 × 52 × 
cost.
Excess annual income
n Income 2004–05 exceeds income 2003–04 by £2,500 or less, and:
– income 2003–04 exceeds £5,060 but less than or equal to £50,000  
EXCESS = income 2003–04: £5,060
– income 2003–04 exceeds £50,000  EXCESS = income 2003–04: 
£50,000
– income 2003–04 is £5,060 or less  EXCESS = 0.
n Income 2004–05 exceeds income 2003–04 by more than £2500, and:
– income 2004–05 exceeds £7,560 but is less than or equal to £52,500  
EXCESS = income 2004–05: £7,560
(Continued)
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– income 2004–05 exceeds £52,500  EXCESS = income 2004–05: 
£52,500
– income 2004–05 is £7,560 or less  EXCESS = 0.
n Income 2004–05 is equal to or less than income 2003–04, and:
– income 2004–05 exceeds £5,060 but is less than or equal to £50,000 ? 
EXCESS = income 2004–05: £5,060
– income 2004–05 exceeds £50,000  EXCESS = income 2004–05: 
£50,000
– income 2004–05 is £5,060 or less  EXCESS = 0.
Defi ning income eligibility for CTC
n One or more dependent children in the family.
n If income is below £50,000  ELIGIBLE FOR CTC.
n If income exceeds £50,000, but CTC family element plus baby addition 
exceeds (0.067 x EXCESS)  ELIGIBLE FOR CTC.
Defi ning income eligibility for WTC
n Mother is in paid work of 16 or more hours a week or, if mother does not 
work or works less than 16 hours a week, father works 16 or more hours a 
week.
n Maximum WTC award exceeds (0.37 × EXCESS)  ELIGIBLE FOR WTC.
Separating CTC-only recipients who are not eligible for WTC on income 
or working hours grounds and those who are eligible for WTC but are not 
taking it up
n If not income eligible for WTC but is working hours eligible  income too 
high for WTC.
n If both income and working hours ineligible for WTC  not working or 
working under 16 hours.
n If eligible both on income and working hours grounds  not taking up WTC.
Notes
* ‘Severely disabled child element’ is not included because of the lack of 
information on higher rate DLA for children.
(Continued)
55
Appendix 1
With the introduction of the new tax credits, a person who initially had a budget line 
AB and worked zero hours (hence, had maximum hours of leisure) will now face a 
different budget constraint (ACD) and will benefi t from higher non-market income 
(from CTC) without necessarily moving into work. This is illustrated by the red 
indifference curves in Figure A1.1. However, someone who worked between 16 and 
29 hours a week may now want to reduce numbers slightly, while benefi ting from 
higher total income from earnings and tax credits than before. This is illustrated by 
the blue indifference curves in Figure A1.1. At the same time, someone who worked 
over 30 hours a week will now benefi t from the 30-hour addition in WTC and may 
work even more hours. This is shown by the green indifference curves in Figure 
A1.1. Thus, compared to a situation of no fi nancial support, the new tax credits are 
expected to have a negative effect on participation and an ambiguous effect on 
working hours (WTC may have a positive effect but CTC may have a negative effect), 
depending on the individual preferences for leisure and income.
For women in couple families with employed partners, the negative effect of CTC 
on participation is expected to be larger because of a higher non-market income 
(partner’s earnings) to begin with. Moreover, the family becomes eligible for both 
WTC and CTC if the partner works 16 or more hours a week, which would have a 
negative effect on both participation and working hours for a second earner in the 
family.
** ‘Disabled worker element’ and ‘severely disabled worker element’ are not 
included because families with DLA-claiming parents were excluded from 
the analysis. ‘Fifty+ return to work payment’ was not included because of 
insuffi cient information on returning to work after a six-month period on 
qualifying benefi ts.
*** Mother or partner works 30 or more hours a week or, if couple family, the 
sum of mother’s and partner’s hours is 30 or more hours, provided one of 
them works at least 16 hours a week.
**** Formal care: day nursery, crèche, nursery school, playgroup or pre-school, 
registered childminder.
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Figure A1  Indifference curves analysis: anticipated effect of CTC/WTC on 
participation and working hours of women with children, compared to no fi nancial 
support (lone parent, one dependent child, minimum wage scenario)
Income
D
B
C
A
Leisure
Working hours
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Appendix 2: Supplementary analysis
Chapter 4: The impact of CTC on labour market 
participation of women with children
Table A2.1  Personal and family characteristics used in propensity score matching 
(PSM) of CTC recipients and non-recipients for labour market participation 
analysis
Background characteristics Lone parents in 2002–03 Couple families in 2002–03
in 2002–03 Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev.
Mother
In work 0.52 0.50 0.76 0.43
Age 33.78 8.17 36.77 6.85
Left education aged
17–18 0.22 0.41 – –
19+ 0.11 0.31 0.23 0.42
White 0.93 0.25 0.94 0.23
Has long-standing illness – – 0.85 0.36
Access to car 0.48 0.50 – –
Family
Age of the youngest child 6.41 4.47 5.99 4.70
N dependent children
1 0.48 0.50 0.34 0.47
2 0.35 0.48 0.48 0.50
Own house 0.33 0.47 – –
Receives WFTC 0.35 0.48 0.15 0.36
Equivalised weekly income 
   (modifi ed OECD scale) 58.25 82.30 – –
£40 or under – – 0.03 0.18
£40.01–127 – – 0.15 0.36
£127.01–200 – – 0.25 0.43
£200.01–274 – – 0.28 0.45
Region
Scotland 0.12 0.33 0.08 0.28
Centre 0.25 0.43 – –
South 0.16 0.37 0.25 0.43
London 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.25
Wales 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.22
N 1,313 3,057
Base: working-age women with dependent children eligible for CTC in 2004–05 who participated in 
both the 2002–03 and 2004–05 rounds of interviews.
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Table A2.2  ‘Balancing test’ of variables used in propensity score matching (PSM) 
of CTC recipients and non-recipients for labour market participation analysis
Background characteristics Lone parents in 2002–03 Couple families in 2002–03
in 2002–03 %  t-test of %  t-test of
 reduction equality of  reduction  equality of
 ‘bias’ means ‘bias’ means
Mother
In work 97.8 0.24 49.2 –2.29
Age 99.2 0.08 99.3 –0.11
Left education aged
17–18 90.0 –0.52 – –
19+ 81.4 –1.70 90.9 1.02
White 84.7 –0.77 35.5 1.27
Has long-standing illness – – 53.3 0.88
Access to car 90.3 –1.05 – –
Family
Age of the youngest child 83.2 1.60 98.2 0.23
N dependent children
1 –34.1 1.71 61.9 1.12
2 37.9 –1.13 100.0 0.00
Own house 99.9 0.01 – –
Receives WFTC 96.8 –0.16 80.8 2.10
Equivalised weekly income 
   (modifi ed OECD scale) 98.3 –0.50 – –
£40 or under – – 92.1 0.39
£40.01–127 – – 79.8 1.47
£127.01–200 – – 87.0 –0.79
£200.01–274 – – 81.1 –1.12
Region
Scotland 99.8 –0.01 –45.4 1.34
Centre 42.2 –0.91 – –
South 77.4 1.37 52.3 0.87
London 53.1 1.40 98.5 0.13
Wales 78.5 0.85 74.3 0.21
Matched sample pseudo R-square 0.006 0.004
LR chi-square 19.97 22.62
Base: matched sample of working-age women with dependent children eligible for CTC in 2004–05 
who participated in both the 2002–03 and 2004–05 rounds of interviews.
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For each variable, t-tests of the equality of means between CTC recipients (treated) 
and the non-recipients (controls) in the matched sample are calculated.
Table A2.3 presents the results of a fi xed-effects logistic regression model of labour 
market participation, estimated using conditional maximum likelihood. Employment 
was defi ned as being in paid work of one or more hours a week. Only the households 
who participated in both the 2003–04 and 2004–05 rounds of interviews and where 
the mother changed her employment status from one interview to another were 
used, since those who did not change their employment status did not contribute 
anything to the estimation. The effects of all predictors were assumed to be the same 
over the two years. Interactions between CTC and ‘year’ and between CTC and 
partnership status were tested but were not found to be statistically signifi cant, so the 
interaction terms were omitted from the fi nal model. Variable ‘year 2004–05’ takes on 
the value of 1 for 2004–05 and the value of 0 in 2003–04, indicating the year-specifi c 
effects. Receipt of CTC did not have a signifi cant effect on participation in either 
2003–04 or in 2004–05.
Table A2.3  Odds of being employed, fi xed effects
Predictor Probability of being employed
 Odds ratio SE
Year: 2004–05 (ref. 2003–04) 1.43** 0.13
CTC 0.88 0.20
Couple (ref. lone parent) 1.22 0.37
Age of the youngest child (ref. 5–10)
0–4 0.52* 0.16
11–15 0.99 0.41
16–19 2.04 1.90
Number of children (ref. 2)
1 3.10** 0.92
3 or more 0.34* 0.17
Mother has a long-standing illness 0.85 0.19
Log likelihood –396.31
Observations 1,218
Persons 609
Base: income-eligible working-age women with dependent children who participated in two rounds of 
interviews 2003–04 and 2004–05 and changed their employment status from one year to another.
*  Signifi cant at 5 per cent; **  signifi cant at 1 per cent (null hypothesis: odds ratio = 1).
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Chapter 5: The impact of WTC and CTC on working hours of 
women with children
Table A2.4  Personal and family characteristics used in propensity score matching 
(PSM) of WTC recipients and non-recipients for working hours analysis
Background characteristics Lone parents in 2002–03 Couple families in 2002–03
in 2002–03 Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev.
Mother
In work 0.79 0.41 0.84 0.36
Age 35.23 7.44 35.80 7.47
Left education aged
17–18 0.24 0.43 – –
19+ 0.12 0.32 – –
White 0.94 0.24 – –
Has long-standing illness 0.81 0.39 – –
Access to car 0.61 0.49 0.80 0.40
Family
Age of the youngest child 7.32 4.36 5.72 4.71
N dependent children
1 0.53 0.50 0.36 0.48
3 or more 0.13 0.33 0.18 0.38
Own house
Receives WFTC 0.45 0.50 0.82 0.39
Equivalised weekly income 
   (modifi ed OECD scale) 0.63 0.48 0.20 0.40
£35 or under 0.30 0.46 0.03 0.17
£35.01–81 0.26 0.44 0.09 0.28
£81.01–120 0.22 0.42 0.13 0.34
£120.01–188 0.18 0.38 0.24 0.43
Region
Scotland 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.31
Centre 0.25 0.43 – –
South 0.16 0.37 0.25 0.43
London 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.20
Wales 0.08 0.28 0.05 0.21
N 554 353
Base: working-age women with dependent children eligible for WTC in 2004–05 who participated in 
both the 2002–03 and 2004–05 rounds of interviews.
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Table A2.5  ‘Balancing test’ of variables used in propensity score matching (PSM) 
of WTC recipients and non-recipients for labour market participation analysis
Background characteristics Lone parents in 2002–03 Couple families in 2002–03
in 2002–03 %  t-test of %  t-test of
 reduction equality of  reduction  equality of
 ‘bias’ means ‘bias’ means
Mother
In work –79.1 –0.79 99.4 0.01
Age 96.3 0.06 98.8 –0.05
Left education aged
17–18 –547.8 –1.74 – –
19+ 74.7 1.00 – –
White 73.3 –0.86 – –
Has long-standing illness –202.4 0.98 – –
Access to car 63.9 –1.23 71.3 0.67
Family
Age of the youngest child –176.4 –0.79 95.2 0.14
N dependent children
1 58.8 –0.79 –128.7 1.02
3 or more 85.2 –0.13 36.9 –0.24
Own house 81.8 –0.75 72.7 –0.93
Receives WFTC 75.4 –1.47 93.8 –0.27
Equivalised weekly income 
   (modifi ed OECD scale)
£40 or under 29.4 1.91 0.9 –0.41
£40.01–127 95.6 0.28 33.5 0.95
£127.01–200 –13.2 –1.50 65.0 0.79
£200.01–274 87.5 –0.95 17.6 –0.25
Region
Scotland 23.4 –0.56 58.1 0.49
Centre 54.2 1.10 – –
South 81.8 –0.38 70.6 –0.17
London 90.9 0.55 82.7 0.40
Wales –1.1 1.40 –54.9 –1.35
Matched sample pseudo R-square 0.02 0.02
LR chi-square 21.91 7.58
Base: matched sample of working-age women with dependent children eligible for WTC in 2004–05 
who participated in both the 2002–03 and 2004–05 rounds of interviews.
For each variable, t-tests of the equality of means between CTC recipients (treated) 
and the non-recipients (controls) in the matched sample are calculated.
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Table A2.6  Effect of WTC on working hours of eligible women with children (linear 
regression)
Background characteristics Lone parents in 2002–03 Couple families in 2002–03
in 2002–03 B Robust SE B Robust SE
Receives WTC in 2004–05 –4.55** 1.06 –0.92 1.31
Mother
In work 0.42 1.55 0.41 1.85
Age 0.04 0.08 –0.12 0.11
Left education aged (ref. 16 or under)
17–18 1.12 1.00 – –
19+ –1.02 1.26 – –
White 0.21 1.59 – –
Has long-standing illness –1.58 1.13 – –
Access to car 0.80 0.92 0.11 1.25
Family
Age of the youngest child 0.55** 0.11 0.37* 0.17
N dependent children (ref. 2)
1 –0.75 0.91 –1.03 1.15
3 or more 0.30 1.32 –1.10 1.46
Own house –0.32 0.92 1.24 1.51
Receives WFTC –0.27 1.33 –0.01 1.56
Equivalised weekly income (modifi ed 
   OECD scale) (ref. £188.01 or over)
£35 or under –7.73** 2.55 17.42* 7.35
£35.01–81 –9.05** 2.40 –0.22 1.85
£81.01–120 –5.26* 2.49 –0.12 1.82
£120.01–188 –3.81 2.30 –1.87 1.24
Region (ref. North)
Scotland –1.16 1.25 –0.23 1.88
Centre –0.98 1.06 – –
South –1.50 1.20 –2.09 1.32
London –1.72 1.84 0.00 2.20
Wales –2.21 1.67 1.13 2.57
Constant 34.22** 4.11 29.98** 3.80
R-square 0.23 0.15
N 554 353
Base: working-age women with dependent children eligible for WTC in 2004–05 who participated in 
both the 2002–03 and 2004–05 rounds of interviews.
*  Signifi cant at 5 per cent; **  signifi cant at 1 per cent (null hypothesis: B = 0).
Longitudinal weights used.
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Table A2.7  Hausman specifi cation test of fi xed effects and random effects 
estimators for working hours analysis
Predictor b (fi xed) B (random) Difference SE
Year: 2004–05 (ref. 2003–04) 0.78 0.54 0.23 0.06
WTC 0.26 –0.77 1.03 0.26
CTC –0.95 –1.10 0.15 0.38
Couple (ref. lone parent) 0.49 0.17 0.32 0.66
Age of the youngest child (ref. 5–10)
0–4 –0.14 –1.39 1.25 0.60
11–15 –1.05 2.23 –3.28 0.80
16–19 –0.49 3.39 –3.88 1.10
Number of children (ref. 2)
1 1.08 0.42 0.66 0.72
3 or more –0.70 –0.15 –0.56 1.08
Mother has a long-standing illness –0.06 0.64 –0.69 0.38
Chi-square 39.94**
Hypothesis that the difference in the coeffi cients B and b is not systematic is rejected; b is a consistent 
estimator.
**  Signifi cant at 1 per cent.
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Table A2.8  Odds of moving from part-time to full-time work for those working 16 
or more hours a week
Predictor Odds ratio Robust SE
Time varying
Year: 2004–05 (ref. 2003–04) 1.20 0.28
WTC 0.76 0.33
CTC 1.03 0.44
Couple (ref. lone parent) 1.13 0.38
Age of the youngest child 1.08* 0.04
Number of children (ref. 2)
1 0.74 0.20
3 or more 0.73 0.30
Mother has a long-standing illness 1.38 0.44
Own house (ref. rent) 0.85 0.25
Time invariant
Mother’s age in 2002–03 0.99 0.03
Left education aged (ref. 16 or under)
17–18 0.80 0.22
19+ 0.87 0.33
White 3.12 2.97
Received WFTC in 2002–03 0.93 0.34
Equivalised weekly income (modifi ed OECD scale) 
   in 2002–03 (ref. £188.01 or over)
£35 or under 1.70 0.94
£35.01–83 1.03 0.50
£83.01–120 1.98 0.99
£120.01–188 1.21 0.52
Region (ref. North)
Scotland 1.26 0.48
Centre 1.27 0.39
South 1.55 0.52
London 1.73 1.14
Wales 1.36 0.78
Wald chi-square 21.11
Observations 746
Base: working-age women with dependent children, who were eligible for WTC in 2004–05, 
participated in three rounds of interviews 2002–03 to 2004–05 and worked 16 or more hours at each 
interview.
*  Signifi cant at 5 per cent (null hypothesis: odds ratio = 1).
Longitudinal weights used.
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Appendix 3: Models specifi cation
Propensity score matching
The propensity score for an individual j is defi ned as:
P(Xj) = Pr (Dj = 1 | Xj)
where:
Dj {0, 1} is the indicator of exposure to treatment,
Xj is the vector of individual’s pre-treatment characteristics.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that, if the exposure to treatment is random 
within the cells defi ned by X, it is also random within cells defi ned by the values of 
the one-dimensional variable P(Xj). Thus, the ‘average treatment on the treated’ (ATT) 
can be estimated as follows:
τ = E {Y1j – Y0j | Dj = 1]
 = E {E {Y1j – Y0j | Dj = 1, p(Xj)}}
 = E {E {Y1j | Dj = 1, p(Xj)} – E { Y0j | Dj = 0, p(Xj)} | Dj = 1}
where:
Y1j is the potential outcome in the situation of treatment,
Y0j is the potential outcome in the counterfactual situation of non-treatment.
Event history analysis: one-way transitions
The response variable for a discrete-time model is the binary indicator of event 
occurrence, so we can fi t a logit regression model of the form:
Logit [hj(t)] = α (t) + β xj (t)
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where:
hj(t) is the hazard of having an event (e.g. entering employment) during time 
interval t for woman j, given no earlier event occurrence,
α (t) is the baseline hazard function that needs to be specifi ed,
xj (t) is the vector of covariates, which can be time constant or time varying, defi ned 
for woman j, and
β is the vector of parameters to be estimated.
Linear panel regression (fi xed effects)
Estimated with panel data, this model allows each individual to have a different 
intercept term. However all slopes are the same.
Yjt = αj + β x’jt + εjt
where:
αj is the unobserved individual-specifi c effect,
εjt is the error term, which is idd over individuals j and time periods t,
xjt is the vector of time-varying covariates, defi ned for woman j and time t, and
β is the vector of parameters to be estimated.
The fi xed effects model treats αj as an unobserved random variable potentially 
correlated with the observed covariates xjt.
